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Abstract
This thesis looks at three important aspects of the well-being of individuals. The ﬁrst
chapter looks at earnings and tries to estimate earnings over the life course account-
ing for selection. It does so by being silent a priori about the relative productivity of
those who stay out of work and instead lets the data speak. Data suggest that non-
workers are not always worse than workers, and it also suggests cohort eﬀects are
also important when lifecycle proﬁles do not follow the same people over the whole
age range. This chapter also provides an economic model which partly explains how
higher productivity individuals may leave the market earlier than low productivity
ones. The second chapter looks at another dimension of well-being over the life
course. It estimates age-happiness proﬁles and it focusses more speciﬁcally on the
identiﬁcation of linear age eﬀects, in a life satisfaction equation which also includes
linear cohort and period eﬀects. As in the ﬁrst chapter, this chapter also accounts
for selective attrition. It ﬁnds that cohort eﬀects and selection are important and an
adequate account of them changes the age eﬀect on happiness quite substantially.
The third chapter looks at domestic violence and tries to ﬁnd a measure of the cost it
has for victims. This is an under-researched area in Economics due to the challenges
it presents to the discipline: it questions some of the assumptions often made in the
literature about cooperation and eﬃciency in households; it cannot be easily (if at
all) inferred from market behaviour; and data are quite sensitive to gather. We have
used a data set designed in the UK, which culminates happiness and income data,
and ﬁnd that costs of violence are often larger than what most households would be
able to compensate victims for.
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Introduction
Back in 2003, I presented what would become my transfer seminar paper at a stu-
dent lunch seminar about variance decompositions of happiness data. This was a
paper that allowed the permanent and the transitory components of happiness to be
correlated, and identiﬁcation was achieved by imposing restrictions on the second
moments of happiness. I still remember having obtained a persistence of happiness
from one period to another of 0.95 and a colleague commented on how that was
usually the persistence of consumption data. I remember dismissing that as an ir-
relevant comment because that was not what the paper was about, but in eﬀect,
the duality between consumption or income and happiness has always been a part
of my research. In those earlier days, the happiness literature was still infant, but
over the past 10 years, it showed several regularities which would not have emerged
if these data were mainly driven by individual idiosyncracies and moods. In eﬀect,
the implications of this research have grown up to the point of there being sugges-
tions to include happiness in country’s national accounts as something to maximise,
or of there being countries inviting reports such as the “Report by the Commis-
sion on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress”, written
by Amartya Sen, Joseph Stiglitz and Jean-Paul Fitoussi (2008). This thesis will
hopefully combine what is best about both income and happiness as two character-
isations of well-being. An important dimension in the analysis of well-being is also
its lifecycle aspect at the individual level. This thesis also explores the challenges
of estimating lifecycle earnings and happiness and contributes to the literature by
proposing new ways of accounting for selection, attrition and cohort eﬀects. This
thesis ends with a reconciliation of income and happiness to calculate the value of
domestic violence, an under-researched area in Economics due to the empirical and
theoretical challenges it oﬀers to the discipline.
The ﬁrst chapter of this thesis estimates age-earnings proﬁles using a ﬁxed eﬀects
estimator to account for selection. Earnings proﬁles and understanding who stays
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out of the labour market at diﬀerent moments in life is important for several reasons.
First of all, for social inequality reasons. If lower earners stay out of the labour
market, the gap in lifetime earnings and wealth they accumulate is larger than if
it is the highest earners. What is more, as people get older, and as they have to
increasingly provide for themselves in old age, it becomes ever more important to
understand these incentives and to estimate the age-earnings proﬁles accounting for
selection into work. The wage regression equation depends on variables which are
available whether the individual works or not, or whether he is observed or missing.
This simple speciﬁcation, estimated for groups of individuals who are likely to face
diﬀerent labour markets, allows us to impute a wage to those not working and
even to those missing from the panel. In doing so, we remain silent about the
relative productivity of workers and non-workers and actually ﬁnd that selection
into employment is not always positive, as is often assumed in the literature. To
rationalise these ﬁndings, this chapter also simulates a lifecycle model of ﬂexible
labour supply under uncertainty which shows how higher productivity individuals
(or higher earners) may ﬁnd it optimal to leave the workforce before lower earners.
The second chapter looks at how happiness evolves over the lifecycle. Self-
reported happiness has long been debated as an indicator of well-being and some
renowned economists, such as Lord Richard Layard, advocate that it should be part
of each country’s national accounts. There are several reasons why this measure is
problematic, and stem from the fact that it runs counter to the revealed preference
mechanism that has dominated Economics for over 100 years. Others criticise it on
the grounds that adaptive preferences, or framing eﬀects lead to serious measurement
error which invalidates comparisons across individuals and over time. Nonetheless,
studies performed in diﬀerent countries, and in diﬀerent time periods show several
empirical regularities, most of which are quite plausible. One of those empirical
regularities is the relation between happiness and age. Most studies have found
a U-shaped proﬁle of happiness over the lifecycle and interpreted it as unfulﬁlled
overoptimistic preferences of the young, who later in life see uncertainty in their lives
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clearing and can live happier lives. However, most of these studies do not account
for age eﬀects together with both period and cohort eﬀects, and the age-related
coeﬃcients are likely to be biased if all three variables have a direct impact on hap-
piness. Moreover, most of these studies do not account for unobserved heterogeneity
nor selective attrition. This chapter reviews the literature on the estimation of age-
earnings proﬁles and on the attempts made to account for all three factors. It also
proposes an alternative speciﬁcation which deﬁnes age, year and cohort in yearly
intervals and still estimates linear eﬀects of all three variables. This approach relies
on longitudinal data and on a particular sampling design where the moment of the
interview is exogenous and varies within each period, so that when individuals of
a particular birth year are interviewed, they may or may not have had their birth-
day and completed an additional year of age. The German Socio-Economic Panel
was used in this paper, ﬁrstly because it has been used extensively to estimate age-
happiness proﬁles, and because it proved to be a data set with adequate sampling
design. Accounting for cohort eﬀects using OLS no longer delivers a U-shape pro-
ﬁle when we include cohort eﬀects. When we account for individual heterogeneity,
using either ﬁxed eﬀects or a ﬁxed eﬀects ordered probit, the age-happiness proﬁle
is decreasing.
Chapter 3 estimates the amount of income a victim of domestic violence would
forego to be freed of violence by estimating its compensating variation. Utility
is measured as self-reported happiness, and is modeled as a function of income
and incidence of domestic violence. The dataset used is unique by including both
victims and non-victims of domestic violence, together with a rich set of conditioning
variables. Most data sets that include information on domestic violence have a very
selected sample of victims only that is collected through refugees or through police
records. However, the data set I use is cross sectional and income is deﬁned in
brackets. Unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for using personality variables
and a continuous measure of income is imputed by matching the individuals in the
data set with comparable individuals from the BHPS. We also discuss and propose
16
solutions to the endogeneity of both income and domestic violence in the happiness
equation. Results suggest that the compensating variation of domestic violence tends
to be a very large share of most households’ annual income (and a not negligible
proportion of national GDP).
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Chapter 1
Correcting selection in
age-earnings proﬁles
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Abstract
This paper estimates age-earnings proﬁles using the Michigan Panel Study of
Income Dynamics, accounting for selection into employment. A wage regression
equation, where log wages depend on age and calendar time, is estimated using ﬁxed
eﬀects. This equation is estimated separately for diﬀerent groups deﬁned according
to their gender, schooling and race. The wage of non-workers can be estimated
using the predicted log wages for those whose age and a ﬁxed eﬀect are available.
Results show that age-earnings proﬁles when including the potential earnings of
non-workers is lower than the observed proﬁle, even though the diﬀerences are not
signiﬁcant for all ages. At later ages, we often ﬁnd workers and non-workers facing
similar wages, which casts doubts on the assumption of positive selection into work,
so often assumed in similar studies. A ﬁxed eﬀects wage regression equation assumes
that unexpected wage shocks are not correlated with individual productivity or the
labour supply decisions made in each period, but avoids relying on positive selection
into employment. We propose a simple lifecycle model of labour supply with iid
shocks to wages which explains decreasing participation over age and rationalises
the choice of higher earners to leave work earlier than middle income earners.
JEL classiﬁcation: D01, D91, H31, J22
Keywords: earnings, labour supply, selection equation, ﬁxed-eﬀects.
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Figure 1.1: Age-Earnings Proﬁles for Male White Heads of Household
1.1 Motivation
Figure 1.1 shows the observed age-earnings proﬁles for male White heads of house-
hold from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) during the 80’s
and early 90’s, according to their schooling. This proﬁle is the result of averaging
the wages of individuals observed working at each age. However, and as Figure 1.2
illustrates, the proportion of individuals working at diﬀerent ages varies substan-
tially. These decreasing participation patterns, specially after age 50, may induce
changes in the skill composition of the group observed working, which would lead
to a selection into employment bias in these proﬁles.
We propose a simple way of accounting for selection which relies on a ﬁxed-
eﬀects wage regression equation where log wages are deﬁned as a function of age
and time. This model assumes that labour supply and potential wages in each
period only depend on the individual-speciﬁc endowment (which captures initial
productivity, preferences and wealth), so that work history and wage shocks do
20
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Figure 1.2: Inactivity rates for Male White Heads of Household
not matter1. A predicted wage can be imputed to those not working as long as
their ﬁxed eﬀect can be estimated, and age can be observed. These imputed wages
will be added to observed wages in estimated corrected age-earnings proﬁles. We
ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in productivity between workers and non-workers is not al-
ways statistically signiﬁcant, in particular for older ages when inactivity rates are
higher, contradicting the so often used assumption of positive selection into employ-
ment(e.g. Petrongolo & Olivetti, 2005; Neal, 2004; Heckman et al., 2000; Chandra,
2003; Blundell et al., 2007). This is the case particularly for women.
Several other methodologies have been proposed to correct for selection. Most of
the literature (e.g. Blundell et al., 2003; Mulligan & Rubinstein, 2004) has hinged
on Heckman’s structural selection model (1974b) to augment an earnings equation
with a participation probability term. This procedure is restrictive insofar as it
relies on a completely parametric selection and wage determination structure and
1If we condition our analysis on work experience instead of age, then the strict exogeneity
assumption of wage shocks on potential wages is no longer as restrictive and can be implemented.
We chose to use age because it is less likely to be measured with error.
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requires an exclusion restriction which inﬂuences labour supply but not wages. The
selection equation, even if speciﬁed in a semi-parametric way, still relies on a one
index type of equation which may be too restrictive if participation decisions de-
pend to some extent on non-wage factors. Fortin (2006) suggests that degrees of
greed and work values are strongly associated with labour market outcomes. If
these factors are not just a response, but they also contribute to participation de-
cisions and market outcomes, then there is no reason to expect these to increase
monotonically with reservation wages. Moreover, the one-index structure cannot
model situations where participation decisions are made jointly by couples (e.g.
Schafgans & Stelcnery, 2006). On the other hand, in times of growing inequality,
such as the 80’s in the US (as documented in Juhn et al., 1993), this procedure as-
sumes constant variance. At the other extreme, Blundell et al. (2007) uses bounds
to partially identify earnings lifecycle proﬁles in the UK. However, because employ-
ment rates are relatively low in the UK, specially for women, the worst case bounds
are not suﬃciently informative. This leads the authors to tighten the bounds using
several assumptions stemming from Economic theory, namely the assumption that
non-workers are lower productivity (and therefore lower earners) than workers. This
restriction is often expressed in terms of a median restriction, where it is assumed
that the median productivity of workers is larger than the median productivity
of non-workers. Petrongolo & Olivetti (2005) uses both matching and imputation
methods; relying on the assumption that the ranking of individuals does not vary
over time, they impute individual wages by recovering their relative positional wage
from the last wave they were observed working; for those that never worked, the
authors match their characteristics to predict non-workers’ potential wages.
Our model allows us to be silent about the relative or absolute productivity
of non-workers vis-a-vis workers. By estimating a wage regression equation for
diﬀerent labour markets, deﬁned according to individual characteristics which do
not change over time (we have used gender, highest schooling and race), we can
condition our model on important wage and labour supply determinant factors. This
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wage regression equation allows us to predict a potential wage when the individual
is not observed working as long as they have worked at least twice during the period.
This is a methodology that works best for individuals with a strong labour market
attachment, and cannot correct for selection of those who work very rarely or not
at all. This work has however shown that assuming positive selection may not be
observed in the data. This methodology can also account for individuals who have
left the panel, being one of the few papers which oﬀer a metholodogy which can
account for selection and attrition at the same time (exception to be made to Zabel,
1998, who uses a three-equation Heckman’s structural selection model); its main
restrictions being having wage regression equations speciﬁed with covariates that
are observed for everybody, even when their wages are not; having all other labour
market determinants being time invariant; and having the wage growth rate over
the lifecycle independent of unobserved heterogeneity.
Despite its simplicity, this model, and the selection results obtained for diﬀerent
skill, race and gender groups, can be explained by models of intertemporal labour
supply with uncertainty and simultaneous labour and consumption decisions which
are consistent with our empirical model and results. The ﬁrst model of ﬂexible labour
supply ever proposed, which assumes labour and consumption are not independent is
discussed in Heckman (1974a). It has a closed form solution and shows analytically
that in a deterministic lifecycle consumption model where individuals can also freely
choose their hours of work, individuals will work more when wages are highest. If
wages are anticipated to increase with age (at least up to a certain age as suggested
by the observed age-earnings proﬁles in Figure 1.1), then Heckman’s model cannot
explain the decreasing participation rates observed in Figure 1.2 for any reasonable
pure time preference discount rate. Low (2005) shows uncertainty in wages causes
individuals to work longer and to consume less at earlier ages in order to build
precautionary savings that they can use against future shocks to wages. This buﬀer
stock of wealth will allow individuals to reduce their working hours at later ages,
when uncertainty is resolved. We will use a simpliﬁed version of Low’s model to show
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speciﬁcally how participation decisions depend on individual productivity (measured
by a wage level and growth) and on non-labour income. These vary substantially
between men and women, and between men and women belonging to diﬀerent race
and skill groups, and shed light on our results. Our model shows that those not
working at later ages tend to be both the lowest and the highest earners, for all initial
wealth levels. This seems to suggest strong income eﬀects for the highest earners
which may also arise in the case of positive matching and reliance on a high-earner
spouse (Neal, 2004). We also observe that those with higher non-labour income, are
also less likely to work, which explains the diﬀerences in participation rates between
men and women, but also between White and Black women (as discussed in Neal,
2004, Black women are less likely to be married and have lower spousal income if at
all).
The next section describes the data we use and is followed by section 1.3 which
describes the empirical model in more detail and presents the estimation results of
the ﬁxed-eﬀects wage regression equations. Section 1.4 shows the corrected age-
earnings proﬁles we estimate. Section 1.5 describes the lifecycle models of ﬂexible
labor supply we simulate and shows the resulting participation and age-earnings
proﬁles they produce. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics
Our paper draws on the 1979-1992 period from the Michigan Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). This panel has been running since 1968 and it became biennial
from 1997. Becketti et al. (1988) provides a very good description of the main
features and aims of the PSID. We chose this data set because it has been the focus
of several studies on participation and income distributions (e.g. Low, 2005). This
period witnessed important changes in the labor market and wage structures. As
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documented e.g. in Juhn et al. (1993), the late 80s and early 90s was a period when
wage inequality increased substantially, specially when comparing wages received by
individuals with diﬀerent characteristics. It would have been preferable to extend
the period to include observations from the late 90’s and beyond. However, in
1993, several changes occurred in the way questionnaires are delivered and answers
recorded (see e.g. Fitzgerald et al., 1998 for an explanation of these main changes).
To avoid including years where additional sources of measurement error could be
confounded with cohort eﬀects, we opt to stop our analysis in 1992. We also exclude
the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) sample because by only including low
income families, it would distort the representativeness of the PSID. In doing so, we
have lost more than half of the original individuals.
We estimate wage regression equations for diﬀerent groups deﬁned according to
characteristics which do not change over the time period. These characteristics alto-
gether deﬁne the labour market individuals face. We use gender, highest schooling
and race. Our analysis requires each group to have enough observations for all ages,
but also individuals whose ﬁxed eﬀects can be estimated, i.e. who worked at least
twice in the 14 years sampled. To keep enough observations in each group, we use
two schooling categories, according to whether individual maximum years of school-
ing is higher than 12 years of schooling (we call this group the College group) or
not, and we only analyse Blacks and Whites. The male sample only includes heads
of household, while the female sample includes both heads of household and wives
of the heads of household. The age range included is between 25 and 64 years old.
This reduced our sample to 7935 individuals, out of which almost 39% responded all
years2. Table 1.1 shows the number of observations available for each group. The
number of observations for the Black groups is relatively low, specially for the Col-
lege groups of both men and women. Estimating our parameter of interest requires
2Some individuals changed their relationship to the head status, or their reported perceived
race. Instead of excluding these individuals from the sample, we used the value that was reported
at least half of the interviewed periods.
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a reasonable number of observations per age group and there are 40 ages within the
working age range. For the Black samples, we collapse age into eight 5-year age
bands, starting in [25, 30[ and going up to [60, 65[.
Table 1.1: Characteristics of the eight labour market groups deﬁned by gender, skill
and race
Men Women
White Black White Black
High College High College High College High College
School School School School
N 1600 1771 210 139 1858 1845 300 212
% wives 84.7 87.8 64.7 78.3
log real hourly wage rates 2.2 2.6 2.1 2.3 1.8 2.2 1.6 2.0
Inactivity rates (%) 8.4 3.8 12.8 8.4 39.1 33.0 41.4 39.1
% women working who are wives 79.8 81.6 53.6 69.5
% individuals w/experience missing 14.5 15.9 18.1 25.9 21.8 22.7 23.7 27.8
Weekly hours of work 46.1 47.2 43.1 44.7 36.0 37.0 38.1 38.8
% individuals lost in estimation 6.7 3.8 10.0 8.6 23.8 16.1 28.0 28.8
We use log real hourly wages as our wage measure. The nominal hourly wages
are readily available in the PSID in 1979-1992. These are deﬂated by the Consumer
Price Index. Table 1.1 shows average wages obtained by ﬁrst computing within-
group averages, and then calculating an unweighted average of these. It shows that
there are wage diﬀerences by gender, skill and race, where men earn more than
women, college wages are larger than high school wages, and Whites earn more than
Blacks. We deﬁne employment status as whether or not a wage is missing in each
period. Inactivity rates are calculated by ﬁrst averaging employment status over the
sampled period for each individual and then by computing the unweighted average
of these over each group. We tried to explore the reliability of the labour force
status employment variable, but this variable has several inconsistent reports over
time and as Table 1.1 shows, it is not available for a large proportion of any group
sample. Women’s inactivity rates are much higher than men’s, and not surprisingly,
women are less likely to work when they are wives than when they are heads of
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household (this can be seen by comparing the percentage of women who are wives
with the percentage of those who are wives only amongst the working group; in the
second group, the incidence of wives is lower). The table also shows that College
groups are more likely to work than High School groups, and Whites more likely
to work than Black groups. These diﬀerences across groups are conﬁrmed by the
average weekly hours of work each group has, except for Black Women, who work
more hours than their White counterparts, once in employment. These very high
inactivity rates still allow us to impute wages for those periods where individuals
are not working for a large fraction of the individuals belonging to each group. For
men, this percentage is at least 90% for all groups. For women however, and even
including wives of the heads of household, this percentage is sometimes as low as
70%.
1.2.2 Earnings, participation and hours over the lifecycle
Figure 1.3 shows the observed average age-earnings proﬁles calculated for all eight
groups using log real hourly wage rates as the measure of earnings. It shows that
the age-earnings proﬁles for all groups are hump-shaped, which can be a result
of compositional eﬀects as the proportion of individuals who stay in employment
decreases sharply for all groups, as Figure 1.4 shows. College White Men are not
only the highest earners, but also the earners with the highest wage growth rate
over the lifecycle.
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We compare our wage and inactivity measures with the ones resulting from
Census data. We use the March Current Population Survey (CPS) waves from a
comparable period and sample. We only include the sample period from 1979 until
1992, White and Black men and women aged between 25 and 64, and we only use
male heads of household while using both heads and wives of heads for women. CPS
does not include a measure of hourly wage rates, but these were derived from annual
earnings and a measure of total annual hours (the product of weeks of work and the
number of hours worked per week). Our employment variable is still a function of
whether the wage is missing or not.
Observed average wages are similar in the two data sets, but there is a much
larger proportion of individuals in the CPS which are not observed working, and
the diﬀerence in inactivity rates according to schooling is much higher in the CPS
than in the PSID. The apparent similarity between the two data sets in terms of
average wages overlooks some interesting diﬀerences across the wage distribution.
Appendix A shows how diﬀerent percentiles of the log hourly wage rate compare
across the two data sets. As found in previous studies, the magnitudes of observed
wages are very diﬀerent between the PSID and the CPS, but the trends are very
similar (See e.g. Gottschalk & Moﬃtt, 1992; Handcock et al., 2000). However, it
is also often the case that the ﬁrst 20% of the individuals are not earning in the
CPS or earning considerably less than in the PSID, but the PSID has a longer
upper tail. Appendix A also shows that conditional on working, CPS workers also
work considerably less hours than in the PSID. Handcock et al. (2000) point out
to diﬀerences in the questionnaires and questionnaire delivery as possible factors
underlying these discrepancies. Given the dimension of the CPS as a representative
cross sectional data set of the US population, it makes more use of proxy and phone
interviews than longitudinal surveys. It does not ask as many questions about
work and earnings as the PSID, which may contribute to measurement error and,
for individuals with lower labour market attachment, signiﬁcant underreporting of
weeks worked or earnings. The notion of headship is also diﬀerent between data sets,
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with the PSID having a more conventional stronger notion of head of household3.
1.3 Empirical strategy and estimation results
We want to estimate the age-earnings proﬁle E (logw |a) , ∀a, faced by an individual
falling into one of the groups deﬁned by gender, race and schooling. However, we
only observe the earnings of those who work, i.e for whom employment status e takes
the value 1 E (logw |a , e = 1). Given the relation between these two parameters in
Eq. 1.1
E ( logw| a) = E ( logw| a, e = 1)P (e = 1| a)
+ E ( logw| a, e = 0) (1− P (e = 1| a)),
(1.1)
observed age-earnings proﬁles will only be similar to the true age-earnings proﬁles
when there is no selection into employment and both workers and non-workers have
the same expected wages, when E (logw |a , e = 1) = E (log w |a , e = 0). Alterna-
tively, if the proportion of non-workers (1− P (e = 1| a)) is negligible, the weight of
the earnings of non-workers in the corrected proﬁle will be so low that signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between workers and non-workers will not have a visible impact on the
corrected age-earnings proﬁles. While this proportion is low at early ages, Figure
1.4 has shown us that this is not the case for any group when they get older.
Our wage regression equation assumes log real hourly wages are a function of
age a, time t and a ﬁxed eﬀect f and is speciﬁed in Eq. 1.2. We include age and
calendar time dummy variables, where time is divided into two sets of seven years,
3The concept of headship in the CPS is diﬀerent from the PSID. The CPS discontinued the
notion of a head of household in 1980 because of the more equal sharing and social changes taking
place in the US. As such, the householder is the person responsible for paying the rent and, in case
a couple is responsible for this, then either can be classiﬁed as the householder. The PSID kept
the original deﬁnition of a head of household for consistency sake, which in married couples, means
that only under serious bereavement of the male, will he not be the head of household. Given that
the PSID is a longitudinal survey whereas the CPS does not allow us to track the same individuals
through time, this also means that there will be a higher share of male breadwinner households
in the PSID because these were more common when the PSID was ﬁrst launched. The eﬀect this
diﬀerence would have on earnings and work patterns is however unclear.
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1979-1985 and 1986-1992. The ﬁxed eﬀect provides a measure of productivity and
also captures important determinants of wages which can be assumed ﬁxed. These
include initial wealth, unobserved ability and preferences for work.
logwit = α0 + αa1 (ait = a) + αt1 (t ≥ 1986) + fi + uit (1.2)
Averaging the individual predicted log wages for each particular age, after con-
ditioning on time, whether the individual works or not, recovers our parameter of
interest E (logw |a). The crucial advantage of this speciﬁcation is that we can ob-
serve the age and the calendar time for all individuals in all years sampled, and not
just for the working years. In fact, we can even observe these variables for those
individuals who have left the panel. However, we are assuming that αa does not
depend on f , i.e, that all individuals within the same (gender, race, skill) group, face
the same wage growth regardless of their unobserved initial productivity. All shocks
to employment and to productivity are therefore independent of initial conditions.
Section 1.4.2 will discuss the plausability of this assumption.
1.3.1 Estimating wage regression equations
Table 1.2 shows the results of our ﬁxed-eﬀects wage regressions, according to Eq. 1.2,
for all the eight groups deﬁned by gender, skill and race. For presentational purposes,
we only present a subset of the coeﬃcients for Whites. For Blacks, the coeﬃcients of
all age intervals are presented. The age coeﬃcients conﬁrm what the observed wage
proﬁle ﬁgures already hinted at. College groups face age earnings proﬁles which
start higher and are steeper, even if disaccelerating at later ages, than High School
groups’. Proﬁles tend to have an inverted U-shape except for Black women, whose
proﬁles for both skill groups are increasing (even if starting at lowest level than all
other groups within the same skill group). For High School men instead, both Black
and White, proﬁles seem mostly ﬂat over the lifecycle. Mid-aged High School White
women earn more than at other ages. Year eﬀects only have a signiﬁcant eﬀect for
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White groups, and show wages increase in the second half of the sample period. For
Blacks, earnings seem to have stagnated.
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These proﬁles diﬀer from the observed age-earnings proﬁles we saw in Figure
1.3, which were all mostly concave. Our accounting for ﬁxed eﬀects will have condi-
tioned the age-earnings proﬁles on time invariant determinants of labour supply and
labour market outcomes. At the same time, ﬁxed eﬀects also accounted for cohort
eﬀects, and our empirical estimation of age-earnings proﬁles will attempt to disen-
tangle cohort from selection eﬀects. These results already show a large diﬀerence
across groups in terms of initial wage level and wage growth over the lifecycle, two
important factors explaining participation decisions, as we will see in Section 1.5.
1.3.2 Selection, cohort eﬀects and attrition
The previous estimation results suggest that estimated age-earnings proﬁles not only
vary substantially across labour market groups, but also diﬀer substantially from
their observed proﬁles. These diﬀerences are due to our account of ﬁxed eﬀects in
our wage model. These age coeﬃcients have been estimated without the inﬂuence
of time invariant individual attributes which condition labour market outcomes,
while their inﬂuence aﬀects the proﬁles in Figure 1.3. Analysing the ﬁxed eﬀects
of workers and non-workers will allow us to make statements about the relative
productivity of these two groups. However, there are two confounding factors in
this estimation. These ﬁxed eﬀects are estimated with an unbalanced panel, and
therefore an overrepresentation of individuals who stayed in the panel for longer.
Secondly, each age-speciﬁc average ﬁxed eﬀect is estimated using individuals from
a diﬀerent set of cohorts. This section will compare the ﬁxed eﬀects of workers and
non-workers and it will discuss the relative importance attrition and cohort eﬀects
seem to have with these data.
Comparing workers and non-workers
To understand whether selection plays a signiﬁcant role in shaping the estimated
age-earnings proﬁles, Figures 1.5 and 1.6 show age-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects averaged for
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White males and females respectively. They show the ﬁxed eﬀects of the working,
the non-working and the total observed sample. These proﬁles were computed for
each of the sample periods separately, but there do not seem to be important diﬀer-
ences in the average ﬁxed eﬀects over the lifecycle according to the macroeconomic
context in which individuals entered the labour market. As seen in Eq. 1.1, the
expected value of the ﬁxed eﬀects for the whole sample E (logw |a) will be similar
to the expected value of the observed sample E (logw |a , e = 1) when there is lit-
tle diﬀerence between workers and non-workers in their productivity, or when the
proportion of non-workers is so small that the impact they have in the overall pro-
ﬁle is negligible. Figure 1.5 shows that for White men, the average ﬁxed eﬀects of
the observed and of the total interviewed sample follow a very similar pattern, and
diﬀerences between the two proﬁles only seem to be signiﬁcant in later ages for the
High School group in the ﬁrst half of the period.
The sample of non-workers does seem to fare worse than workers throughout the
life course, except at the end of the working life, when inactivity rates are higher
and the selection term in Eq. 1.1 more important. For women, and because the
proportion of women staying out of the labour force at any one period is larger,
Figure 1.6 shows a slightly larger diﬀerence between the average ﬁxed eﬀects of the
observed and the total sample. The diﬀerences between workers and non-workers
throughout the lifecycle seem to be the same as for White men: while there seems
to be positive selection into employment for mid-ages, this is not the case for later
ages. χ2 tests comparing the average ﬁxed eﬀects of workers with non-workers, for
the ﬁrst and the second half of the period, do show that this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant
for all four White groups (ﬁrst two columns of Table 1.3).
Due to a smaller sample size of non-workers for all ages, average ﬁxed eﬀects
of non-workers vary more across the lifecycle and conﬁdence bands are also larger4.
But broadly, Figures 1.5 and 1.6 suggest that selection into employment later in life
4Conﬁdence bands calculated, for each age a as f¯a ± 1.96
(
1
Na
√∑
i
fi (ai = a)
)
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is not positive. The reasons why some individuals retire earlier than others does not
seem to be driven by their productivity.
For the Black groups, conclusions are very similar and results presented in Ap-
pendix B.
37
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
25 35 45 55 65
age
FE Workers FE Non−Workers
FE Both
High School White men 1979−1985
−
2
−
1.
5
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
25 35 45 55 65
age
FE Workers FE Non−Workers
FE Both
High School White men 1986−1992
−
3
−
2
−
1
0
1
25 35 45 55 65
age
FE Workers FE Non−Workers
FE Both
College White men 1979−1985
−
2
−
1.
5
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
25 35 45 55 65
age
FE Workers FE Non−Workers
FE Both
College White men 1986−1992
Figure 1.5: How diﬀerent are workers from non-workers: Fixed eﬀects of White men
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The role of attrition and cohort eﬀects
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 showed how selection can be a signiﬁcant phenomenon and still
diﬀerences between the ﬁxed eﬀects of workers and of the total sample are small.
However, they also showed that these ﬁxed eﬀects change over the lifecycle. For
men, these increase with age for the High School group, or they remain relatively
constant over time and close to zero for the College group. For women, ﬁxed eﬀects
of these two groups decrease with age. For all groups except the group of College
men, we have a proﬁle of average ﬁxed eﬀects of the total sample which could not
have been produced by a balanced panel with 40 periods5. These changes in the
average ﬁxed eﬀects occur either because of selective attrition, or because of cohort
eﬀects.
If we want to analyse attrition, we have to extend the panel of interviewed people
and impute a ﬁxed eﬀect to the years when individuals already left the panel. In this
context, where we will have for each age the observed sample of stayers interviewed
and the missing sample of attritors, our parameter of interest is deﬁned in Eq. 1.3.
E ( logw| a) = E ( logw| a, e = 1, stayer)P (e = 1, stayer| a)
+ E ( logw| a, e = 0, stayer) (1− P (e = 1, stayer| a))
+ E ( logw| a, e = 1, attritor)P (e = 1, attritor| a)
+ E ( logw| a, e = 0, attritor) (1− P (e = 1, attritor| a))
(1.3)
Figure 1.7 shows the attrition rate of the White groups in both sample periods.
While negligible in earlier years of the panel, attrition rates are as high as 20% for
some age groups in the 1986-1992 period. Attrition rates are larger for Blacks, as
can be seen in Appendix B.
5By construction, the age-speciﬁc average ﬁxed eﬀect proﬁle for the whole sample should be a
ﬂat line around zero.
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women
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Table 1.3: Testing for selective employment and attrition: Whites
H0 : FEw − FENw = 0 FEobs − FEatr = 0 FEw − FEexc.w = 0
χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
High School White men
1979-1985 1054.5 0 301.7 0 932.7 0
1986-1992 1367.6 0 444.5 0 789.6 0
College White men
1979-1985 934.5 0 227.8 0 789.8 0
1986-1992 1453.7 0 422.4 0 587.1 0
High School White women
1979-1985 317.6 0 116.1 0 310.7 0
1986-1992 387.2 0 215.5 0 306.0 0
College White women
1979-1985 481.0 0 110.3 0 409.5 0
1986-1992 404.6 0 231.8 0 363.9 0
Results based on the χ2 test (Rϕ) (RCovR′)−1 (Rϕ)′ ∼ χ2q, where ϕ is the vector of estimated ﬁxed eﬀects
R is the projection matrix that transforms the ﬁxed eﬀects into a diﬀerence in means between two groups
Cov is the covariance matrix of the ﬁxed eﬀects and q is the number of restrictions, one for each age level.
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Figure 1.7: Attrition rates for Whites %
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Diﬀerences in the FE between stayers and attritors would be reﬂected in a dif-
ference in the proﬁle which uses the whole set of observations (both stayers and
attritors) and the proﬁles of those who stay or those who attrite. We have seen that
conditioning on employment status does not aﬀect the expected value of the ﬁxed
eﬀect E (f |a) (mainly because the selection term is too small when workers are very
diﬀerent from non-workers). A comparison of the average ﬁxed eﬀects between ob-
served workers (instead of all observed), attritors and the whole set of observations
(including attritors) will inform us on the relative importance of selective attrition.
Figures 1.8 and 1.9 show us the results for White men and women.
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Average ﬁxed eﬀects of observed workers (similar to the proﬁle of all observed
individuals) match closely the proﬁle which uses the whole set of observations, in-
cluding the attritors. This shows selective attrition does not have a substantial
impact in the estimation of lifecycle ﬁxed eﬀects and wages, even though attritors
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from workers or from observed individuals (as shown in
Table 1.3, second test statistic and p-value). Table 1.3 also shows the χ2 and the
p-value of a test which compares individuals observed working with the remaining
groups, attritors included. Results suggest no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between these
groups. A joint account of attrition and selection does not seem to have a signif-
icant impact on estimated ﬁxed-eﬀects proﬁles. However, when we look at these
three groups across age, we can see signiﬁcant diﬀerences between workers and at-
tritors. For men in the second half of the period, attritors seem to be worse than
workers for most ages, while this is not the case in earlier years of our sample. For
women, the pattern is reversed and attritors are signiﬁcantly more productive than
workers in the second half of the period. So in eﬀect, for women, the positive eﬀect
of attrition on average ﬁxed eﬀects of the total sample cancelled out the negative
eﬀect of non-workers, so that the proﬁles of workers and the total sample are now
closer than they were when missing attritors had not been accounted for (Figure
1.6). Most importantly, these Figures and Table 1.3 show that the proﬁle which
accounts for attrition does not seem to be any closer to the ﬂat line around zero for
most groups. This suggests that attrition is not one of the major factors underlying
the variability of estimated age-speciﬁc average ﬁxed-eﬀects.
The results for Blacks are in Appendix B. For College groups in the ﬁrst half,
attritors are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from stayers, but this is mainly due to the
small sample of College Black people in earlier years. Attritors tend to be worse
than stayers for all groups and periods.
The remaining inﬂuence on this estimation, which can be confounded with se-
lection eﬀects are cohort eﬀects. Figure 1.10 shows how average ﬁxed eﬀects change
across cohorts. It shows that average ﬁxed eﬀects change signiﬁcantly with cohort
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and this relation also varies with the group (Figure 9 in the appendix shows the
average ﬁxed eﬀects by cohort for the Black groups). There are stark diﬀerences
between men and women; while the ﬁxed eﬀects of later born women are larger than
those of earlier born women, except for the group of High School White women, for
men that is reverse, except for College Black men.
Figures 1.10 and 9 do suggest that cohort eﬀects are the main reason why age-
speciﬁc average ﬁxed eﬀects do not average to zero for all ages, for both men and
women. Regarding men, because later born men have on average lower ﬁxed eﬀects,
that pulls the average ﬁxed eﬀect of younger ages in Figure 1.8 down (and of older
ages up). This explains the estimated increasing ﬁxed eﬀects of the total sample.
The opposite occurs for women.
Our approach does not allow us to separately identify cohort and selection eﬀects.
The next section will discuss the selection-corrected proﬁles we obtain by including
the potential wages of non-workers in the corrected proﬁle. We will also estimate
these corrected proﬁles using the NLSY which follows a set of cohorts through their
adult life in an attempt to attenuate the impact of cohort eﬀects in our selection-
corrected proﬁles. In order to account for attrition, we will use predicted wages
for every observation, including those observations of individuals who dropped the
panel. These results are however in Appendix C.
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Figure 1.10: Average ﬁxed eﬀects by cohort 1919-1966
1.4 Results
This section shows the impact diﬀerences in ﬁxed eﬀects across workers and non-
workers have on estimated age-earnings proﬁles. The corrected proﬁles in this section
follow Eq. 1.1. The corrected proﬁles include the potential wages of non-workers,
estimated using a regression equation which accounts for ﬁxed eﬀects (and therefore
cohort eﬀects). These proﬁles will thus show both how non-workers compare to
workers (selection eﬀect) over the lifecycle, but this eﬀect will be confounded by
how earlier-born cohorts compare to later-born cohorts (cohort eﬀects). We have
seen in Figure 1.10 that the ﬁxed eﬀects of later born women tend to be higher than
the ﬁxed eﬀects of earlier born women, and this is the reverse for men. Figures 1.11
and 1.12 show the results for all eight groups in each sample period respectively.
Proﬁles which further account for attrition are in Appendix C.
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Figure 1.11: Age-earnings proﬁles 1979-1985
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Figure 1.12: Age-earnings proﬁles 1986-1992
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For men, the combination of cohort and selection eﬀects yield corrected proﬁles
which are lower than observed proﬁles at later ages. While this could be an indica-
tion of positive selection into employment, this result seems to be explained almost
integrally by strong negative cohort eﬀects, given that the ﬁxed eﬀects of workers
and non-workers did not seem to be statistically diﬀerent at older ages. The reverse
is observed for women.
1.4.1 Comparing Age-earnings proﬁles with the NLSY79
Our paper aims to distinguish the role of cohort eﬀects and selection in the corrected
proﬁles analysed in Section 1.4. For this reason, we repeat the estimation of age-
earnings proﬁles using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79).
The NLSY is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young men and young
women who where 14 to 22 years of age when they were ﬁrst interviewed in 1979.
We use the NLSY until 2008. The NLSY includes three samples; the main one which
is representative of people born between January 1, 1957 and December 31, 1964,
totalled 6111 in the ﬁrst wave; a supplement which tries to oversample from the
most representative non-White ethnic groups and poorer groups in the US, mainly
Hispanics, Blacks and economically disadvantaged white youth born in the same
period; lastly, a sample of the military population which was born in the same
period. We exclude the poor and the military supplement as we had excluded the
SEO sample for the PSID, and we continue looking at heads of household only.
By following fewer cohorts (all individuals born between 1957 and 1964), we want
to conﬁrm how much of the correction we obtain is due to selection into employment
and not cohort eﬀects. We chose NLSY79 because it covers most of the lifecycle years
we have focussed on. In 1979, the youngest were 14, and by 2008, the oldest were 51.
At the same time, this data set is known to have lower attrition rates than the PSID
because contrary to the PSID, individuals who attrite one year can return to the
sample in later years. According to Fitzgerald et al. (1998), only 52% of the original
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1968 PSID children sample were still in the PSID 21 years later and, according to
Wu & Li (2005), still 57,6% of the original sample remains until 2004, i.e. 25 years
later. Regardless of this, the retention rates were still over 70% for all groups in
2004. Because we are focussing only on individuals between 25 and 64 years old, we
only get observations from 1982 until 2008, so that our eﬀective sample period is 20
sampled years spanning 27 years. Because this sample is so young, only 6% of the
total sample of heads of households are at least as old as 25. Otherwise, over 62%
who started the panel were still interviewed in the last wave available 2008.
Table 1.4 shows some summary statistics of the sample we are using for esti-
mation. We have 5284 individuals available, which is the same order of magnitude
of the PSID sample, even though we are looking at a much more homogeneous co-
hort. The longer time span also guarantees that we lose a very small proportion
of individuals in estimation because out of 20 years, more than 90% of individuals
from any group have worked at least twice. Inactivity rates are much lower than
for the PSID, which is mainly because the NLSY sample is too young (the oldest
individuals are 51). Average log real wages are also slightly higher for all groups.
Attrition rates, and as discussed, are much lower, which is surprising, given that
this is a longer panel.
Table 1.4: Characteristics of the eight labour market groups deﬁned by gender, skill
and race: NLSY
Men Women
White Black White Black
High College High College High College High College
School School School School
N 1077 1178 208 110 980 1350 185 196
log real hourly wage rates 2.4 2.8 2.1 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.1 2.4
Inactivity rates (%) 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.7 8.4 7.1
Attrition rates (%) 14.5 12.2 10.2 12.1 11.6 8.9 12.3 9.7
% individuals lost in estimation 2.5 2.7 2.9 1.8 5.0 2.0 8.1 3.1
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While more homogeneous in terms of cohort eﬀects, the NLSY sample includes
individuals who experienced signiﬁcant changes in family structure, in college partic-
ipation, in labour demand, and in wage inequality. Earnings of earlier ages are thus
estimated based on individuals born earlier, and earnings of later ages are estimated
based on individuals born later. Fixed eﬀects of mid ages are estimated using the
same birth cohorts. Therefore, by narrowing down the number of birth year cohorts
being analysed compared to the PSID, we are more likely to see a lower impact of
cohort eﬀects relative to selection eﬀects using NLSY.
Our wage regression equation is similar to the one presented in Eq. 1.2, but
we include an additional dummy variable to represent the years of the NLSY not
included in the PSID. Table 1.5 shows the χ2 tests of selection and attrition we
conducted and explained in Section 1.3.2. For all groups, there is selection both
into employment and attrition.
We repeat the analysis of ﬁxed eﬀects of workers and non-workers, and plotted
the ﬁxed eﬀects proﬁles of these two groups, as well as the total sample’s ﬁxed
eﬀects (Figure 1.13). For high school groups of both sexes and races, workers are
better than non-workers, conﬁrming a positive selection into employment. This
result was not clear when using the PSID. For College groups, positive selection is
not as clear. While it seems to be conﬁrmed for College Black women, it is not
at all conﬁrmed for their White counterparts. One reason why this may be the
case may be the typical non-labour income faced by these two groups of women.
While College White women are more likely to have an employed spouse, that is not
the case for College Black women. For College men, while non-workers seem to be
lower productivity for most ages, this is not the case for the whole proﬁle. Another
diﬀerence between these proﬁles and the proﬁles estimated using the PSID is the
fact that most of the age-ﬁxed eﬀects proﬁles for the whole sample are closer to zero
and ﬂatter, which conforms to our assumption that cohort eﬀects are likely to be
less pronounced using the NLSY.
Figure 1.14 further analyses the impact of attrition in these proﬁles and suggests
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that attritors tend to be more productive, specially for women. The inclusion of
attritors in the proﬁles led to corrected ﬁxed eﬀects proﬁles closer to a zero-centered
line for some of the groups, even if not for all.
The corrected age earnings proﬁles using the NLSY, are in Figure 1.15. Results
are striking and show that the corrected and observed proﬁles are practically the
same, specially for White groups. While workers and non-workers exhibit diﬀerent
average ﬁxed eﬀects for most ages, the proportion of non-workers is often too small
to show substantial deviations in the corrected age-earnings proﬁles. But the basic
pattern of selection persists: the selection into employment of women, specially at
later ages, does not seem to be positive. The corrected proﬁles lie marginally above
the observed ones. For men, this is not the case.
Table 1.5: Testing for selective employment and attrition using the NLSY
H0 : FEw − FENw = 0 FEobs − FEatr = 0 FEw − FEexc.w = 0
χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
High School White men 582.3 0 304.3 0 442.7 0
College White men 479.8 0 122.1 0 441.2 0
High School White women 309.6 0 238.3 0 908.2 0
College White women 413.5 0 143.7 0 474.4 0
High School Black men 150.8 0 152.7 0 166.7 0
College Black men 179.4 0 201.7 0 205.1 0
High School Black women 129.9 0 195.3 0 340.1 0
College Black women 251.4 0 188.1 0 278.3 0
Results based on the χ2 test (Rϕ) (RCovR′)−1 (Rϕ)′ ∼ χ2q, where ϕ is the vector of estimated ﬁxed eﬀects
R is the projection matrix that transforms the ﬁxed eﬀects into a diﬀerence in means between two groups
Cov is the covariance matrix of the ﬁxed eﬀects and q is the number of restrictions, one for each age level.
54
−
.
6
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
25 35 45
age
FE Workers FE Non−Workers
FE Both
High School White men
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
25 35 4555
age
FE Workers FE Non−Workers
FE Both
College White men
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
25 35 45
age
FE Workers FE Non−Workers
FE Both
High School White women
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
25 35 4555
age
FE Workers FE Non−Workers
FE Both
College White women
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
25 35 45
age
FE Workers FE Non−Workers
FE Both
High School Black men
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
25 35 4555
age
FE Workers FE Non−Workers
FE Both
College Black men
−
.
6
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
25 35 45
age
FE Workers FE Non−Workers
FE Both
High School Black women
−
1
−
.
8
−
.
6
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
25 35 4555
age
FE Workers FE Non−Workers
FE Both
College Black women
Figure 1.13: How diﬀerent are workers from non-workers: using the NLSY
55
−
.
1
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
25 35 45
age
FE Workers FE all
FE attritors
High School White men
−
.
1
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
25 35 4555
age
FE Workers FE all
FE attritors
College White men
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
25 35 45
age
FE Workers FE all
FE attritors
High School White women
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
25 35 4555
age
FE Workers FE all
FE attritors
College White women
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
25 35 45
age
FE Workers FE all
FE attritors
High School Black men
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
25 35 4555
age
FE Workers FE all
FE attritors
College Black men
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
25 35 45
age
FE Workers FE all
FE attritors
High School Black women
−
.
4
−
.
2
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
25 35 4555
age
FE Workers FE all
FE attritors
College Black women
Figure 1.14: How diﬀerent are attritors from those who stay: using the NLSY
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Figure 1.15: Age-earnings using NLSY: following cohorts born between 1957 and
1964
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1.4.2 Exogenous wage shocks: a discussion
The key assumption of this model which allows us to impute a potential wage to
non-workers is the assumption that wages behave according to Equation 1.2. Ac-
cording to our model, wage growth does not depend on previous experience nor
on unobserved heterogeneity. This section uses the NLSY and estimates the ﬁxed
eﬀects using a shorter time span (up to age 40) and tests how it correlates with
future average hourly wage growth. Wage growth was estimated as a log diﬀerence.
When NLSY starts with a bi-annual frequency, the log diﬀerence was divided by
two, assuming equal growth in both years. Table 1.6 shows the p-values of the cor-
relation between the individual ﬁxed eﬀects estimated with shorter time age spans,
and annual average wage growth. Results show that for most groups, the correlation
between ﬁxed eﬀects and future wage growth is often negative and not statistically
signiﬁcant. Hence, despite the strong assumptions made to estimate the wages of
non-workers, data seems to be consistent with the assumptions made.
Table 1.6: Testing for exogeneity of shocks to wage growth using the NLSY
Correlation coeﬃcient p-value
High School White men -0.0031 0.9290
College White men -0.0052 0.8727
High School White women -0.0445 0.2326
College White women 0.0025 0.9346
High School Black men 0.1577 0.0539
College Black men 0.2111 0.0511
High School Black women -0.0289 0.7496
College Black women -0.1890 0.0193
1.5 Who works and why? A life cycle model of
labour supply
The previous sections show that workers of diﬀerent groups deﬁned according to
gender, race and skill, seem to have diﬀerent incentives to participate in the labour
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market, at diﬀerent moments in the lifecycle. While College White women at later
ages seem to make their labour supply and retirement decisions based on factors
beyond their unobserved productivity, this does not seem to be the case for men
or College Black women. While this may well be explained by diﬀerences in non-
labour income across these groups, initial wage level, and wage growth over the
lifecycle also seem important indicators of labour supply decisions and, as the ﬁxed
eﬀects estimation results of our wage regressions showed in Table 1.2, these vary
substantially across these groups too. This section will explore models of intertem-
poral labour supply decisions proposed in the literature. It will discuss the extent
to which models are able to replicate the decreasing participation patterns observed
in the data, as well as the diﬀerences across these groups in terms of non-labour
income, wage level and growth, and how these factors seem to explain why selection
into employment varies across women, skill group and race.
The initial models of intertemporal labour supply were discussed in Heckman
(1974a). When the incentive to save (the interest rate) equals the discount rate,
ﬂexible hours of work always leads workers to work more when wages are higher
(and higher earners to work more than lower earners), which results in a proﬁle of
hours of work tracking the wage schedule. The consumption proﬁle will however
depend on how the marginal utility of consumption changes with leisure. If leisure
and consumption are substitutes, then individuals ﬁnd it optimal to consume more
when wages are higher. If leisure and consumption are complements, then consump-
tion will decrease with wages. When the discount rate is diﬀerent from the interest
rate, the intertemporal substitution eﬀect where there is tracking between wages
and hours of work remains, but may be oﬀset by very large incentives to accumu-
late wealth (often unreasonably high given common parameterisations of such a life
cycle model), specially if consumption and leisure are substitutes. These models
are deterministic and often have a closed form solution. Low (2005) discusses an
extension of this model which includes uncertainty in wages. We will show how this
simple extension allows us to explain our results to a great extent. We also simu-
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late a deterministic model with endogenous wages, given the strong assumption we
have used in this paper of exogenous shocks to wages, but this model does not seem
to oﬀer a better explanation to our results than the model with uncertainty and a
simple wage formation process.
The baseline optimisation model is in Eq. 1.4.
max
{cs,ls}
T∑
s=t
βs−t
(cηs l
1−η
s )
1−γ
1− γ (1.4)
subject to
As+1 = (1 + r) (As + (H − ls)ws − cs)
AT+1 = 0
H ≥ ls ≥ 0
The utility function chosen for each period s is an isoelastic Cobb Douglas and
individuals choose consumption c and leisure l in each period which maximise the
discounted lifetime utility. This is subject to a wealth accumulation law of motion,
where wealth A increases deterministically according to an initial wealth level, and
the accumulated amount of income saved or borrowed throughout life. There are
no borrowing constraints. In any given period, individuals increase their stock of
wealth when their consumption is lower than their earnings, and eat away their
wealth otherwise. There is also a no bequest constraint, and a restriction on the
amounts of leisure available in each year, which have to be nonnegative and never
higher than the total amount of hours allocated for leisure and work H . The ﬁrst
order conditions yield the optimal intratemporal leisure decision as a function of
current consumption.
lt = max
{
min
{
ct
wt
1− η
η
,H
}
, 0
}
(1.5)
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This means that in eﬀect there is only one control variable to account for in the
dynamic programming process, which we ﬁnd by ﬁnding the value on consumption
that maximises the value function over the grid of wealth levels, for each wage rate.
The results of this simple model, which assumes a deterministic exogenous wage
process, is presented next. The following two sections present the results of two
models which change the wage determination process, and assess how closely these
extensions produce simulated proﬁles similar to observed proﬁles.
1.5.1 The basic lifecycle model with ﬂexible labour supply
Wages are assumed to grow at an exogenous rate b for the ﬁrst 30 years of work
and decrease by the same factor from then on until the end of the working life set
at T = 40 years.
⎧⎨
⎩ wt = w0 × b
t if t ≤ T − 10
wt = w0 × b(T−10)+(T−10−(t−1)) if t > T − 10
(1.6)
This model will be simulated for individuals who vary according to their initial
wealth level (a proxy for non-labour income) and the wage proﬁle they face (with
both initial value and growth rate varying). We have used the same initial wealth
for all individuals. We use 200 equally spaced values, from 0 to to 100 tens of
thousands of US dollars (deﬂated by the CPI 1985 index). This grid was adjusted
each period according to the maximum savings and debt that an individual could
accrue in the previous period. For the initial wage levels, we use the deciles of the
average observed wage distribution faced by each of the eight groups discussed in
our paper (see Figure 1.3 for a diagram of the average wage proﬁle conditional on
age of these eight groups). For the wage growth rates, we use the average growth of
each of these proﬁles over the entire life span6.
6All wages were left censored at log(3.5). The average wage growth rate observed for low
educated White men was 0.00878; for high educated White men, it was 0.00146; for low educated
White women: 0.01098; for high educated White women: -0.00762 (for this group, we assumed a
monotonically decreasing wage proﬁle); for low educated Black men: 0.03401; for high educated
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The remaining parameters of the model have been chosen based on Low (2005).
We set the interest rate to r = 0.016 and the discount factor to β = 1/1.009. We
chose a neutral leisure share η = 0.5, but kept γ = 2.2 and H = 5200. These
parameter values assume a slight incentive to save and substitutability between
consumption and leisure.
We solve for this model using backward induction. Consumption and leisure are
treated as continuous variables. Because leisure is a limited variable, we solve for
three diﬀerent optimisation problems for each wealth level - the continuous case,
where leisure is deﬁned as a function of consumption as in Eq. 1.5, the case of maxi-
mum leisure (the inactivity case), and the case of minimum leisure7. We choose the
consumption and leisure which yield the maximum value for the value function. At
period T , optimal consumption and leisure are found analytically using the terminal
condition. For each wealth level, optimal consumption equals the sum of current
wealth and the earnings obtained in that period. By comparing the value for the
utility function across all three possible scenarios for leisure (and its resulting con-
sumption) we obtain the optimal consumption and leisure for each value of wealth
with which the individual starts the last period. For all the remaining periods, we
ﬁnd the policy function of consumption and leisure by maximising the value function
for each value of wealth available at the beginning of each period. We have used
linear interpolation to match the wealth (and the value function) resulting from an
optimal choice to the wealth (and value function) values available in the grid found
in the previous step.
Figures 1.16, 1.17 and 1.18 show the simulated proﬁles for all eight groups of
participation, hours of work and wages (both observed and corrected) resulting from
this model. A detailed analysis of the consumption, leisure and wealth proﬁles, and
Black men: 0.01033; for low educated Black females: 0.01759; for high educated Black females:
0.00666.
7Each period’s utility function in Eq. 1.4 is not well-deﬁned when either consumption or leisure
are close to zero, given our choice of parameter values. We have set a minimum for either con-
sumption or leisure of 1.
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of how these vary with wage and wealth parameters, is available in Appendix D.
These proﬁles were drawn for two diﬀerent levels of initial wealth. Participation
increases with age for all groups except for College White women, the group which
faces negative wage growth. Participation is not monotonically increasing for College
Black women either, who face a relatively low wage growth rate and low startup
wage. So in eﬀect, results show that participation tracks wages and tends to be
higher when wages are higher or growing positively. This result is conﬁrmed in
Figure 1.17, which shows hours of work displaying the same shape as the wage
process that generates them. The only exception is the College White male group,
where hours of work continuously decrease over the life course, decreasing at a
slightly faster rate when wage growth becomes negative. This is the case because
wage levels are so high (relative to their growth rate) that allows this group to
sustain increasing consumption and leisure proﬁles while accumulating wealth early
in life, which is run down at an increasing rate when work-related earnings start
decreasing. For all groups, higher non-labour income reduces participation in the
labour market.
The resulting wage proﬁles show that wages of those who work are, if diﬀerent,
always higher than unconditional wages, which suggests positive selection into em-
ployment. This prediction of the model proposed in Heckman (1974a) has motivated
most authors (e.g Petrongolo & Olivetti, 2005; Neal, 2004; Heckman et al., 2000;
Chandra, 2003; Blundell et al., 2007) to assume positive selection into employment
instead of being silent about the relative or absolute productivity of non-workers.
While this paper has shown that this may not always be the case, this model cannot
explain the sharp decrease in participation observed in real data (nor the constant
slight decrease in hours of work shown in Appendix A). Our two next models pro-
pose simple extensions to the wage process which lead to simulated proﬁles closer
to the data.
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Figure 1.16: Participation rates in the basic model
64
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Hours of work of 
low educated White men
 
 
low wealth
high wealth
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Hours of work of 
high educated White men
 
 
low wealth
high wealth
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Hours of work of 
low educated White women
 
 
low wealth
high wealth
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Hours of work of 
high educated White women
 
 
low wealth
high wealth
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Hours of work of 
low educated Black men
 
 
low wealth
high wealth
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Hours of work of 
high educated Black men
 
 
low wealth
high wealth
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Hours of work of 
low educated Black women
 
 
low wealth
high wealth
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Hours of work of 
high educated Black women
 
 
low wealth
high wealth
Figure 1.17: Hours of work in the basic model
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Figure 1.18: Wage proﬁles in the basic model
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1.5.2 The lifecycle model with ﬂexible labour supply and
deterministic endogenous wages
Several authors have argued that when labor supply decisions not only determine
current, but also future wages, this investment eﬀect of participation leads individ-
uals to work longer hours earlier in life (see e.g. Eckstein & Wolpin, 1989). This
literature, often focussing on the participation choices of married women, can ex-
plain why participation may be high at earlier ages. In the standard model discussed
in the previous section, individual wages grow at an exogenous rate, whether or not
they have worked in previous periods. It does not take into account human capital
accumulation acquired on the job, nor its depreciation. This section shows a very
simple deterministic model with endogenous wage growth, where wages in each pe-
riod t depend on the total number of years the individual has worked before, call
these e. Each year working augments wages by a factor b and each year away from
the labour market depreciates wages by the same factor. The wage determination
process is deﬁned in Equation 1.7.
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
wt = w0 × b1−t+I(t=1) if e = 0
wt = w0 × b3−t−I(t=1) if e = 1⎧⎨
⎩ wt = w0 × b
t−1 if t ≤ e
wt = wt−1/bt−(e+1) if t > e
if e ≥ 2
(1.7)
In this model, labor supply decisions not only impact on current income and
wealth, but also on future wages and income possibility sets. This presents an
incentive to work more at earlier ages and to retire earlier when the returns to the
investment in human capital are low - the investment eﬀect. However, because the
returns of labor supply are now larger than in a model with exogenous wage growth,
and because the cost of accumulating debt has become even cheaper, endogenous
wage growth may lead to more consumption and more leisure at earlier ages because
these can be ﬁnanced in a shorter spell of time - the consumption eﬀect. This will be
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even more so the higher the wage growth rate faced by individuals. The investment
eﬀect is similar to an increase in r relative to β which individuals can now inﬂuence
with their labour supply decisions.
The parameters of this model are the same as for the basic model, except that we
have not considered negative wage growth, instead looked at what happens when
there is no wage growth at all (benchmark situation where wages do not depend
on accumulated wealth). Figures 1.19, 1.20 and 1.21 show the simulated proﬁles of
participation, hours of work and wages for all eight groups. Appendix D describes
the results of our simulations in detail. Results are very similar to the ones in the
previous section, when wages were assumed to be exogenous. Leisure continues to
be decreasing for most groups, and inactive people, if any, continue to be the low
earners with high initial wealth, whose incentive to work in the start of their life is
low and who consume their wealth at a constant rate until the end. The groups who
face an increasing number of hours of leisure over time, and therefore decreasing
hours of work as Figure 1.20 shows, are College White men, who have the highest
wage levels and a very low wage growth rate, and College White women, who face no
wage growth during their lifecourse and only have moderate wage levels. These are
also the two groups who do not ﬁnd it optimal to incur any debt because recouping
debt by working is more diﬃcult than for other groups, whose wage growth rates,
and therefore, whose returns to experience, are much larger. These two groups ﬁnd
it optimal to increase both leisure and consumption over the lifecourse, even if the
growth rate of either is more modest than the growth rate of consumption for other
groups with higher returns to experience.
The wage proﬁles resulting from these optimal decisions are shown in Figure
1.21. As in the previous section, selection into employment, if individuals do stay
out of work which the model can hardly produce, is positive and occurs earlier in
life. Endogenous wages do oﬀer an additional theoretical eﬀect on intertemporal
choices that can oﬀset the intertemporal eﬀect found in Heckman (1974a), but there
are still very dominating discounting and intertemporal eﬀects making leisure higher
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at earlier ages than in the data, specially for moderate and high wage growth.
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Figure 1.19: Participation rates in the model with deterministic endogenous wages
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Figure 1.20: Hours of work in the model with deterministic endogenous wages
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Figure 1.21: Wage proﬁles in the model with deterministic endogenous wages
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1.5.3 The lifecycle model with ﬂexible labour supply and
stochastic exogenous wages
Low (2005) shows uncertainty in wages causes individuals to work longer and to
consume less at earlier ages in order to build precautionary savings that they can
use against future shocks to wages. This buﬀer stock of wealth will allow individuals
to reduce their working hours at later ages, when uncertainty is resolved. We extend
our basic model of intertemporal labour supply and add uncertainty to the wage
formation process. Wages are subject to a shock drawn from a discrete distribution.
⎧⎨
⎩ wt = wt − 1∀ ∈ (0.4, 0.9, 0.99, 1, 1.1, 1.3), ∀T ≤ 30wt = wt − 1∀ ∈ (0.4, 0.9, 0.95, 1, 1.1, 1.2), ∀T ≥ 31 (1.8)
To mimic the inverted-V shaped wage proﬁle of the previous sections, we use
a probability distribution such that the expected value of the wage is larger than
current wage up to period T−10, and lower than the wage from then on8. The shock
is realised at the end of each period, so that once decisions are made in each period,
there is a shock to the wealth carried over to the next period. We have simulated
this model by generating 5000 wage trajectories over the lifecourse for each group,
level of wages and wealth. The optimal choices made under these 5000 scenarios
were averaged to produce the resulting proﬁles.
Figures 1.22, 1.23 and 1.24 show the results. Appendix D discusses these results
in more detail. Results are very encouraging. This model replicates decreasing
participation over the lifecycle for all groups. The participation rate is higher than
in deterministic models due to uncertainty, and leads to very little variation in
participation rates across groups or non-labour income levels. We observe a decrease
in participation for all White groups except the High School women, and also for
Black High school men, but only for a few years. Several results emerge from these
ﬁgures (as well as ﬁgures in the appendix): those with high non-labour income
8The probability distribution is the same in both periods (0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.35, 0.2, 0.1).
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(such as the median College White woman according to Neal, 2004), work less;
those with a high wage growth and low initial wage level smooth consumption and
leisure over their lifecycle, and run down their wealth almost monotonically. For
these groups, those at the top of the distribution in terms of initial wage can work
more at all ages, which explains positive selection observed in the male groups.
Those with lower wage growth rates (ﬂatter proﬁles) are therefore more likely to
postpone leisure and consumption to accumulate wealth and buﬀer against future
negative wealth shocks. In these groups, those with higher initial wage level will
work harder than everybody else in the beginning of their worklife, but retire earlier.
Lower productivity workers in these groups work less than everybody else, except at
later ages when highest productivity group overtakes them. This means that those
who retire earlier can be both high productivity workers, who accumulated enough
wealth over the lifecycle and income eﬀects kick in, or low productivity workers,
because of lower opportunity costs of staying at home. The former group of high
productivity/early retirement has however been overlooked in most of the empirical
literature accounting for selection into employment.
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Figure 1.22: Participation rates in the model with uncertainty in wages
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Figure 1.23: Hours of work in the model with uncertainty in wages
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Figure 1.24: Wage proﬁles in the model with uncertainty in wages
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1.6 Conclusion
Age-earnings proﬁles are instrumental in the analysis of inequality between diﬀerent
social groups (e.g. gender or ethnicity). They are also important in the analysis
of intertemporal labor supply decision processes. However, age-earnings proﬁles
constructed solely from averaging observed wages at diﬀerent ages are contaminated
by selection into employment bias. Most of the literature corrects for selection
by assuming non-workers are lower productivity than workers. This paper uses a
very simple approach that is silent about the relative or absolute productivity of
non-workers. We construct potential wages by using estimated ﬁxed-eﬀects from
a regression of earnings on age and time-related variables. These are available for
everybody, whether they work or even whether they are observed at all. This allows
us to build a dataset that adds potential wages for non-workers - correcting for
selection. Corrected proﬁles do not always lie below observed proﬁles, running
counter to the assumption of positive selection into employment. We repeated our
analysis using the NLSY to disentangle cohort and selection eﬀects. These results
suggest that selection is statistically signiﬁcant, but workers can be lower earners
than non-workers.
These results are still preliminary and several further steps need to be taken for a
clearer picture of labor supply decisions. As yet, we have nothing to say about those
individuals that have never been observed working. This approach can however be
easily used jointly with existing (better informed) procedures in the literature that
do try to estimate the proﬁle for all individuals, even those for whom there is no wage
information. This is more important for women, the group with lower participation
rates, and for Blacks.
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Chapter 2
Revisiting the age-happiness
proﬁle: Estimating age, period
and cohort eﬀects.
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Abstract
This paper estimates age-happiness proﬁles using alternative speciﬁcations for age,
period and cohort. It discusses the two main methods, ﬁxed eﬀects and constrained
generalised linear models, which are used to identify age eﬀects in the happiness
literature. This paper will estimate and replicate the ﬁndings of previous studies
which have used restrictions on the coeﬃcients for age, period and cohort. This
paper also proposes an alternative way of identifying the eﬀects of age, period and
cohort. Instead of imposing restrictions on the vector of parameters, it explores the
discrete nature of the data and redeﬁnes age so that age, period and cohort eﬀects
can be estimated, even at the individual level. It relies on the fact that not all indi-
viduals are born/interviewed on the same day, which creates an exogenous source of
age variation within the same birth year cohort. Once linear eﬀects of age, period
and cohort are accounted for this way, and once ﬁxed eﬀects can separately identify
age and period eﬀects, age-happiness proﬁles estimated using OLS, ﬁxed eﬀects or
ordered probit ﬁxed eﬀects diﬀer from those already found in the literature.
JEL classiﬁcation: D69, D84, I30
Keywords: age-happiness proﬁle, APC models, linear eﬀects
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2.1 Introduction
Figure 2.1 shows age-happiness proﬁles estimated for diﬀerent cohorts, and also for
the overall sample. The unconditional proﬁle averages the happiness of all indi-
viduals of a given age, without accounting for year nor cohort. While this proﬁle
seems to suggest happiness decreases with age up to the early 50’s, at which point
happiness stagnates or even starts increasing again, the proﬁles observed when fol-
lowing each cohort seem to tell a diﬀerent story. Conditional on age, we can see
that average happiness of cohorts born earlier is higher. This could also be because
of time eﬀects being diﬀerent in the years when diﬀerent cohorts had the same age.
These proﬁles were estimated using observations collected between 1984 and 2003.
The cohort speciﬁc proﬁles of cohorts born between 1939 and 1959 are broadly hor-
izontal shifts of each other, but this is not the case for proﬁles of older and younger
people. In fact, the two most recent cohorts show a ﬂat proﬁle, which sits close to
the unconditional proﬁle, and are very distinct from all others. With a quick visual
inspection of Figure 2.1, we therefore see that time eﬀects, cohort eﬀects and age
eﬀects, all seem to matter in describing happiness.
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Figure 2.1: The happiness proﬁle in age, following diﬀerent cohorts 1984-2003
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However, because of the linear dependence between age, period and cohort, often
happiness equations are estimated without accounting for all three factors. In par-
ticular, age-happiness proﬁles are important per se. Longevity is increasing and it is
important to evaluate how happy older people are likely to be. Wilson (1967) con-
cluded that younger people are happier. Most studies in Psychology often ﬁnd that
age has no impact on happiness at all, which is consistent with the hedonic tread-
mill theory. The Economics literature has often produced a U-shaped age-happiness
proﬁle, where the dip is around the age 50, which is consistent with Figure 2.1 (for
a review of the literature on age-happiness proﬁles, see Frijters & Beatton, 2008;
Clark, 2002). Easterlin (2001) suggests that this pattern reﬂects unfulﬁlled overop-
timistic expectations of the young, who adapt to present circumstances later in life.
Frijters & Beatton (2008) and Clark (2002) suggest that cohort eﬀects may underlie
the relation between age and happiness. While Frijters & Beatton (2008) argues
that cohorts are “just a missing aggregate variable speciﬁc to an age-group but
where we do not know what the missing variable is”, other authors recognise that
cohort eﬀects are the true essence of social change (e.g. Yang et al., 2008; Cribier,
2005). The author of this paper tends to agree more with the second view, where
age eﬀects capture lifecycle regularities we observe across time (and actually not
just the cumulative eﬀect of life events which tend to happen at particular stages
of one’s life), cohort eﬀects capture the evolving social context whose impact aﬀect
individuals in diﬀerent stages of their lifecycle diﬀerently. Identifying both eﬀects,
and separably from each other, is then a key aspect of research in social sciences.
Age and cohort eﬀects are diﬃcult to account for when time eﬀects also exist,
due to the linear dependence between the three variables. A lot of work has been
done in Epidemiology, Demography and Sociology to analyse such models. In these
areas, the two most common approaches are constrained generalised linear models
(CGLIM) and the intrinsic estimator (see e.g Yang et al., 2008, for a review of this
literature). CGLIM often specify an outcome variable as a linear function of age,
cohort and period variables, and then impose some constraints on the vector of
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parameters. These constraints are arbitrary and are needed because the model is
underidentiﬁed. The intrinsic estimator decomposes the eﬀect of the three variables
into a full rank parameter vector space b0 and a vector which deﬁnes the linear de-
pendence between the three variables B0 and which is thus unrelated to the outcome
variable. The full rank coeﬃcient vector is assumed orthonormal to B0, so that it
is invariant to the selection of constraints on B0. So in eﬀect, this methodology
also imposes constraints on the parameters of our model, indirectly by assuming
orthonormality. In the economics literature, often cohorts are not accounted for or
are deﬁned as larger intervals of time than age or period (this falls under the CGLIM
category of models which in this case assumes equality of cohort coeﬃcients within a
certain time interval). This works well if the changes in the experiences of diﬀerent
cohorts which would be relevant in happiness studies occur gradually and slowly over
time, such as political and economic stability, life expectancy, social protection, and
so on. However, if we deﬁne birth cohorts as ten-year intervals of birth years, we also
expect their coeﬃcients to be small and statistically insigniﬁcant because the years
included in each interval are arbitrary, and so is the change from one interval to the
next. This paper shows that this does not seem to be the case. Other studies have
assumed linear cohort eﬀects were zero and estimated higher order eﬀects. Needless
to say, if the linear eﬀect is not zero, higher order eﬀects will be biased. Other
studies have used ﬁxed eﬀects to estimate age eﬀects because the year of birth is a
time invariant variable at the individual level (e.g Clark, 2002; Frijters & Beatton,
2008; Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1998). However, ﬁxed eﬀects does not separate
age from period eﬀects, so age eﬀects are also biased.
This paper will replicate the most common speciﬁcations of age, cohort and pe-
riod eﬀects in the economics literature. It also proposes an additional method which
estimates linear, as well as nonlinear, eﬀects of age, period and cohort, when all three
variables are deﬁned in yearly intervals. To do so, instead of imposing constraints
on the parameters, it redeﬁnes the variable age. Our measure of age exploits the
discreteness of the data and the fact that not all individuals are born/interviewed
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in the same day. As such, some individuals have had their birthday by the time
of the interview while others have not. It is then possible to observe individuals
belonging to the same birth year cohort with diﬀerent ages purely due to exoge-
nous reasons. This creates an exogenous source of age variation within the same
birth year cohort, which breaks the linear dependence between the three variables.
These linear eﬀects, as well as nonlinear eﬀects are thus identiﬁed with very few
parametric assumptions, even at the individual level. We also try to separate the
importance of other confounding factors in the age-happiness proﬁle, such as attri-
tion and unobserved heterogeneity. Results do diﬀer with this method, and both
attrition and unobserved heterogeneity matter in the estimation of age-happiness
proﬁles. We also use alternative cohort eﬀects which are not linked to the birth year
of each individual, but to the year they entered school. This cohort concept has
been found to be important for economic outcomes, such as educational outcomes
(see e.g Pischke, 2007).
The next section describes the linear dependence problem and how linear eﬀects
of all three factors are identiﬁed. If these variables were measured continuously,
and not in yearly brackets, surely the linear dependence problem would subsist.
However, we argue that this redeﬁnition of age is a better measure of age, closer
to how age should be deﬁned given that it has been discretised, and also allows
for linear eﬀects of age, year and cohort to be separately identiﬁed. Section 2.3
describes the data and how sample design of GSOEP facilitates this study. Section
2.4 estimates the age-happiness proﬁle using alternative methods and discusses the
results while Section 2.5 concludes.
84
2.2 Identifying the eﬀects of age, period and birth
cohort
We are interested in identifying the eﬀects of age a, cohort c and period t on in-
dividual subjective well-being h. For individual i, these three factors are however
linearly dependent as follows:
ait = t− ci, ∀t, ∀i (2.1)
If h is well described by a general function f (a, c, t) and an additively separable
error term u, Eq. 2.1 implies:
hact = f(a, c, t) + u = f(act, t− act, t) + u = g(act, t) + uc (2.2)
Even if we would like to estimate the impact of age on happiness by conditioning
the analysis on cohort and period, Eq. 2.2 shows that the initial happiness equation
f can always be rewritten as a function of age and either period or cohort. To see
the implications of this, let hz represent the partial derivative of h with respect to
z, z = a, c, t. Eqs. 2.1 and 2.2 then show that the linear eﬀect of age on happiness
ha equals ga. Using a chain rule, we can see that ga = gt. This is because age and
time grow at the same rate, for any given cohort.
If birth cohort is omitted however, estimated eﬀects of age will be biased in the
following way:
E (ga| t) = E (fa| c, t)− E (fc| t, a) , (2.3)
From Eq. 2.3, we see that, if the birth cohort eﬀects are positive (negative), the
age eﬀect is underestimated (overestimated).
Identifying age, cohort and period eﬀects is an issue that arises in several diﬀerent
contexts. Examples include the analysis of the incidence of particular infectious dis-
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eases (e.g. Holford, 1983; Clements et al., 2005), changes in national savings ratios
(e.g Deaton & Paxson, 1999), scientiﬁc productivity of researchers and vintage capi-
tal model of trucks or personal computers (e.g. Hall et al., 2005), wage structure and
college premium (e.g. Welch, 1979; MaCurdy & Mroz, 1995; Card & Lemieux, 2001;
B. Fitzenberger & Schnabel, 2001), human capital and early career choices (e.g.
Card & Lemieux, 2000) and job satisfaction (e.g. Jurges, 2003). Diﬀerent studies
adopt diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategies. The most common type of assumption speci-
ﬁes each of the three variables as polynomials and restricts some of their coeﬃcients1.
B. Fitzenberger & Schnabel (2001); Jurges (2003); Holford (1983); Clements et al.
(2005) assume the linear eﬀects of one of the factors is zero. They then estimate
higher order eﬀects of all three factors, and their interactions. Simpler models will
assume that interactions between all three factors are not important and estimate
an additively separable model. This model either omits the linear eﬀect of one of the
factors, or excludes that factor from the speciﬁcation altogether (Deaton & Paxson,
1999). All of these speciﬁcations have so far deﬁned age, cohort and year in equally
spaced intervals of the same length. Other authors have however proposed an ad-
ditively separable model where the length of the observation periods of the three
factors is no longer the same (see e.g. Card & Lemieux, 2000, 2001; Hall et al., 2005).
However, Holford (1983) shows that using a model variables are deﬁned with unequal
intervals can lead to a saw-tooth proﬁle of our parameter of interest. Finally, a less
common assumption was used in e.g. Welch (1979) and Berger (1985), where cohort
eﬀects would be fully characterised by a function of cohort size. This approach relies
on having a suﬃcient statistic for one of the factors available, which may be diﬃcult
when our variable of interest is life satisfaction. Alternatively, other authors have
used an instrumental variable approach (see e.g. Heckman & Robb, 1985). They
propose identifying a variable that aﬀects the dependent variable but, in the long
run, is only correlated with age, cohort or year. In the context of happiness studies,
this instrumental variable also proves to be diﬃcult to ﬁnd.
1See MaCurdy & Mroz (1995); Hall et al. (2005) for good reviews.
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In this paper, we compare diﬀerent speciﬁcations of age, cohort and period eﬀects
in a linear regression model. We further propose a way of estimating all linear eﬀects
when age, cohort and period are deﬁned in equally spaced intervals. To do so, and
because data are observed on a yearly basis, age a has been redeﬁned as completed
years of life while the deﬁnition of birth cohort and period remain the same. If an
individual has had his birthday by the time the data are recorded, he is t− c years
old. If his birthday happens later in the year, he is just t− c− 1 years old. Hence,
as the usual measure of age in yearly longitudinal surveys, completed years of life
will also be augmented by 1, but not for all individuals as soon as the calendar year
changes. Depending on the exact time of the interview, individuals belonging to the
same birth cohort have diﬀerent completed ages in any given moment in time. This
exogenous variation in the moment of the interview breaks the linear dependence
between age, cohort and time, even at the individual level. This deﬁnition allows
Eq. 2.1 to hold exactly for those whose birthday happens in the day of the interview.
On the contrary, the usual deﬁnition of age is only close to the true relation for those
who happen to be born in the ﬁrst days of the year and the error increases with
the lateness of the day of birth. Take individuals born in 1978 and in 1979 being
observed in 1980. According to Eq. 2.1, individuals born in 1978 are all 2 years old
and those born in 1979 are all 1 year old. However, individuals can have any age in
the interval ]0,2[ if they are born in 1979 or any age between ]1,3[ if they are born
in 1978. Our redeﬁnition of age would assign completed years of either 0 or 1 to
individuals born in 1979 and completed years 1 or 2 to individuals born in 1978.
You may argue that deﬁning age as completed years of age is as arbitrary as
deﬁning it the usual way (which is the right way in continuous time). However,
this deﬁnition breaks the linear dependence between the 3 variables, and as we will
show, has smaller measurement error.
Lets deﬁne the exact age at the time of the interview as
agetrue = beginning current year + s - ( beginning birth year + b ),
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where s stands for the moment of the interview and b is the moment of birth.
Both variables are deﬁned as a fraction of a given year and they are both deﬁned
in a unit interval, e.g. s, b ∈ [0, 1], where 0 means the beginning of a year and 1 the
end of a year. While it is not controversial to assume b ∼ U (0, 1), it is assumed
that the moment of the interview is also equally likely in any day of the year for the
sake of illustration, so that s ∼ U (0, 1).
When age is deﬁned as usual, i.e., as ageusual = beginning current year - begin-
ning birth year, the underlying error is
errorusual = b− s ∈ [−1, 1]
Given the assumptions made on b and s, we know this error has zero mean and
variance 1
6
2.
However, when age is deﬁned as completed years only, that is
agecompleted =
⎧⎨
⎩ beginning current year - beginning birth year - 1 if s  bbeginning current year - beginning birth year if s > b
(2.4)
the underlying error is
errorcompleted =
⎧⎨
⎩ b− s− 1 if s  bb− s if s > b ∈ [−1, 0] (2.5)
This error has mean −1
2
and variance 1
18
. This paper thus proposes a biased but
lower variance estimator of age3, which breaks the linear dependence between age,
2The joint density of b − s is f (b− s) = 1 − |b− s|. Hence the expected value of the error
associated with the usual deﬁnition of age is E ( errorusual ) =
∫ 1
−1 (b− s) [1− |b− s|] db−s = 0 and
the variance is Var(errorusual ) =
∫ 1
−1 (b− s)2 [1− |b− s|] db−s = 16 .
3The expected value was computed by solving E (errorcompleted) =
E [(b− s)− 1| b− s  0]P (b− s  0) + E [b− s| b− s < 0]P (b− s < 0), and similarly for
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period and cohort, even at the individual level. All it requires is for the moment
of the interview to sometimes happen before, and other times happen after each
individual’s birthday4.
2.3 Data
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) records both the date of birth of the
interviewees and the date in which interviews are held. It can happen that in a given
calendar year t, individuals born in the same year and thus belonging to the same
birth cohort c have diﬀerent completed years when interviewed, depending on
whether they have had their birthday by the time of the interview. Age is deﬁned as
in Eq. 2.4, and it can thus happen that two respondents from the same birth cohort
have diﬀerent ages in any moment in time.
As discussed in the previous section, this deﬁnition of age seems more natural
given the discreteness of the data. If age is just deﬁned as t− c, it is augmented by
1 just because the calendar year changed. This applies to all individuals, whether
they are exactly t− c years, t− c− 365 days minus almost 6 hours old or t− c+365
days and almost 6 hours old. By using the deﬁnition in Eq. 2.4, age eﬀects are not
confounded with artiﬁcial “year-shifting” eﬀects. These are identiﬁed as long as the
time of the interview is purely exogenous. Individuals interviewed after and before
their birthday should be identical in all except their number of completed years.
Unfortunately, only the month of birth is observed while the day of birth would
provide a more accurate deﬁnition of age. In practice, age ends up being deﬁned as
t − c − 1 if the day of the interview is prior to the 15th of the month of birth and
the variance.
4If alternatively, we had assumed that s had a degenerate distribution at 0, so that all interviews
would happen at the beginning of the interview year, the error of the usual measure of age would
have expected value 12 and the error of our proposed measure would have expected value − 12 . Both
measures would have the same variance. As we move from this degenerate case to the uniform case
described, our proposed measure becomes lower variance and with a higher bias than the usual
measure.
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t− c thereafter.
Figure 2.2 shows how interviews are spread throughout the year. Interviews
tend to be more concentrated in the ﬁrst quarter, but they do exhibit some variation
throughout the year. One source of variation is purely exogenous and stems from the
ﬁeldwork design5. However, there are households being contacted more than once
so that their interviews tend to be carried out later in the year. If these individuals
are a selected sample, who may be for instance more stressed and therefore less
happy, retrials can undermine this identiﬁcation strategy. For this reason, we also
carry out the analysis excluding the individuals interviewed later in the year. We
also run ﬁxed eﬀects estimation of happiness equations to account for unobserved
heterogeneity.
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Figure 2.2: Average number of interviews conducted in each month over the 20-year
period
Happiness is measured by the self-reported general satisfaction variable in the
GSOEP. Interviewees are asked every year, at the end of the questionnaire, the
following question:
And ﬁnally, we would like to ask you about your satisfaction with your
5I thank Jan Goebel from DIW Berlin for all the information regarding this issue.
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life in general. Please answer by using the following scale, in which 0
means totally unhappy, and 10 means totally happy.
How happy are you at present with your life as a whole?
It is a discrete variable taking 11 integer values from 0 to 10.
Table 2.1 shows a cohort table with the sample we analyse. It represents average
happiness level for individuals with a particular age in a particular year. Each row
shows the evolution of the happiness mean at a given age, across time. Each column
reads cross sectional values for all ages in a given period. Kermack et al. (1934)
notes that lifecycle trends are observed diagonally for each cohort. With the usual
age deﬁnition, each cell would correspond to a diﬀerent cohort, all observed at a
particular age along a row, or in a particular year, along a column, and each diagonal
would represent how each cohort’s average happiness evolved over time (and as they
got older). With age deﬁned as completed years, this is no longer the case. Age does
not increase by 1 between interviews (years), as the evolution across any diagonal
assumes for each cohort. As an illustration, we signal in bold the possible ages an
individual who is 20 years old in 1986 and another who is 41 in 1985 can have in
the following years. This thus shows that we can identify age, cohort and period
eﬀects, even at the individual level. A cohort is now followed along a thick diagonal
and not a line diagonal. And this comes when age is redeﬁned in a way which more
closely matches the continuous notion of age and has lower measurement error.
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Table 2.1 also allows us to conﬁrm some results from Fig. 2.1. It shows that,
conditional on age (along each row), older cohorts are happier on average than
younger cohorts, but there seem to be time eﬀects which make some years’ average
happiness higher for all ages (year 1990, right after the fall of the Berlin wall, clearly
shows higher average happiness for all ages, specially for younger ages). It shows that
following a speciﬁc cohort (along a thick diagonal), happiness is broadly decreasing
with age, but this result is not there when we look at age-happiness proﬁles for each
year individually (each column), the same way it was not there when we pooled all
years together in Fig. 2.1. This table provides additional evidence of the importance
all three linear eﬀects seem to have, and the importance of accounting for both cohort
and time eﬀects when estimating age-happiness proﬁles.
2.4 Estimation Results
This section shows the results of estimating happiness equations which specify age,
cohort and period eﬀects in diﬀerent ways. Age is deﬁned as in Eq. 2.4, calendar
time is as usual the year of the interview, and cohort is birth cohort. We also kept
the most common speciﬁcations of happiness equations for comparability of the age
eﬀects with other studies. The most common covariates used are gender, bundes-
land, nationality, marital status, number of members in the household, educational
diploma, labor force status, household income and self-reported satisfaction with
health. The latter is a categorical variable ranging from 0 to 10, where 10 represents
full satisfaction with health and 0 complete dissatisfaction.
In order to guarantee enough observations per cell, the sample is restricted to
individuals of Turkish, Balkan6, East German or West German background, and who
stay in their initial bundesland throughout the sample period. Those who are still in
schooling, on maternity leave, have been drafted or only have a very sporadic source
6The countries that used to form Yugoslavia are also grouped into one category, again for sample
size considerations.
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of income are also excluded. Married but separated individuals are not accounted for
either. Individuals are only followed after they have completed their 20 years of age
and only until they reach 60 years of age. This is to prevent an over-representation
of older individuals in the sample.
Table 2.2 presents the OLS estimation results. The ﬁrst six columns show the
results of basic speciﬁcations which do not include additional covariates. Column
I shows the most common speciﬁcation of happiness equations where cohorts are
omitted, the age eﬀect is modeled with a quadratic function and year dummies
are included. Column II adds cohort eﬀects by assuming constant cohort eﬀects
within 5-year intervals, as in Card & Lemieux (2001). Column III is a simpliﬁed
version of B. Fitzenberger & Schnabel (2001) which models all three variable eﬀects
using cubic polynomials and assumes the cohort linear eﬀect is zero. Column IV
further includes the linear cohort eﬀect so that we can compare and analyse the
consequences of omitting the cohort linear eﬀect. Columns V and VI use cohort
and period dummies, but the former models age using a quadratic function while
the latter uses age dummies. Column V is used to understand how much of the
diﬀerences we observe between our estimates of the age and squared age coeﬃcient
are due to poor accounting of cohort eﬀects while column VI tells us whether the
quadratic approximation is a good one. Columns VII - XII repeat the ﬁrst 6 columns
but include the additional covariates. Robust standard errors are computed and
errors are clustered at the individual level.
Results are striking. While the benchmark model yields the usual U-shape hap-
piness proﬁle with respect to age (in column I, the inﬂexion point occurs around
age 76, outside our age range; in column VII, it occurs in the late 30s), no other
speciﬁcation which accounts for cohort and time in some way replicate this result.
When using 5-year cohort intervals or polynominal functions, the age-happiness pro-
ﬁle estimated is inverted-U, with maximum happiness around the 20s or 30s (some
proﬁles are actually decreasing, given that the inﬂexion point is estimated to be at
an age outside our sample range). When cohort and time dummies are included,
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the predicted proﬁles are increasing. Exception is the speciﬁcation with added co-
variates and age dummies, when the age-dummy variables stop being statistically
signiﬁcant. So while the quadratic speciﬁcation seems to be forcing a hump which
the age dummies do not conﬁrm, there is not enough variation in the data to iden-
tify the eﬀects of age, cohort and time dummies in the last column (only the 1991
dummy variable is signiﬁcant from the results shown). There are additional points
about time and cohort eﬀects worth mentioning. When we add cohort 5-year interval
dummies, cohort eﬀects do not seem to vary much, which is to be expected given the
arbitrariness of the cutoﬀ points. However, cohort polynomials or dummies do point
to statistically signiﬁcant positive cohort eﬀects in the basic speciﬁcation, suggesting
individuals born later are on average happiest, even if these cohort eﬀects are cap-
tured by socio-demographic characteristics whose changes correlate with diﬀerences
across cohorts. Time eﬀects are estimated to be negative, even if their signiﬁcance
wanes in more saturated and more ﬂexible speciﬁcations. But it is surprising to
see cohort eﬀects being estimated as positive, suggesting that those born later, the
younger cohorts, are happier. Visual inspection of Fig. 2.1 and of Table 2.1 would
suggest otherwise. But neither Fig. 2.1 nor Table 2.1 represent the eﬀects of each
of the three variables independently from the others.
The estimates of the additional covariates do not yield surprising results7. House-
hold net income has a very signiﬁcant albeit small impact on happiness. The di-
vorced individuals fare worst and the widowed are worse oﬀ than single individuals,
even though age and satisfaction with health are in the equation. Households with
4 members or more are doing poorly, even after conditioning on income. The un-
employed are the least happy group while the Full-time workers and the retired
individuals are the happiest. Men are signiﬁcantly less happy than women. Similar
to other studies, educational diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant. There are
also important regional and nationality diﬀerences. Health is the most important
factor in explaining happiness.
7These are available upon request.
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All in all, estimating a happiness equation with age redeﬁned and without condi-
tioning on birth year still yields a robust U-shape proﬁle. Results indicate however
that the age coeﬃcient estimates from previous work are in fact a combination of
positive cohort eﬀects and negative age eﬀects, specially for older ages. Looking at
the standard errors of the age coeﬃcients, one further sees that the true explanatory
power of age is very reduced, once year of birth is adequately accounted for in the
analysis. This can also be due to lack of variation in the moment of the interview,
because all three variables lose explanatory power when more saturated models are
used.
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2.4.1 Attrition, Unobserved Heterogeneity and Ordinal na-
ture of happiness
The previous estimation results are subject to a number of criticisms. First of all
and as already discussed, the exogeneity of the moment of the interview only holds if
all the interviewees answered the ﬁrst time they are contacted or if the reasons why
they might not have replied in the ﬁrst attempts are uncorrelated with happiness,
conditional on all covariates8. Interviews being carried out later in the year might
be contaminated with those individuals who are less available and with a higher
valuation for time. In fact, Frijters & Beatton (2008) showed that there seems to
be selective attrition and the average happiness of those who stay in the panel is
lower than the overall average. If we think that those who need to be contacted
again are also more likely to attrite in the future, we should worry. We reestimate
the happiness equations for those that are interviewed only in the ﬁrst months of
the year to avoid including interviews where respondents had to be contacted more
than once. We also look at those who stay in the panel for the whole 20 waves
and also for those who answer the ﬁrst and the last questionnaires. Finally, we
analyse how results change when we account for unobserved heterogeneity and/or
the ordinal nature of the happiness variable by running ﬁxed eﬀects, ordered probit
and ordered ﬁxed eﬀects logit estimations9. Results are in Appendix E.
Late interviews
The regressions are repeated for only the ﬁrst months of the year. This aims to
withdraw from the sample those individuals who have to be contacted more than
once because their interviews tend to be concentrated later in the year. Tables 9, 10
and 11 show the estimated age-happiness proﬁles when only the ﬁrst three, four and
8The number of attempts made for each interviewee is actually a piece of information which
should be made public.
9We thank Paul Frijters and Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell for useful discussions about their method
explained in Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters (2004) and for having made their Stata code available.
All errors are my own.
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six months respectively are used for estimation. In short, all results remain qualita-
tively the same, which indicates that results do not seem to vary according to the
number of attempts made before the interviews take place. In the basic speciﬁca-
tion, an inverted-U shaped age-happiness proﬁle seems to emerge, and the inﬂexion
point remains at very young ages. However, in the full more ﬂexible speciﬁcations,
age, cohort and time eﬀects remain statistically insigniﬁcant.
Stayers
The happiness equation is also estimated with a balanced sample to account for a
possible selection bias. First only those individuals who answer all of the question-
naires are included and results are presented in Table 12. Only 2273 out of 33852
individuals satisfy this condition and so, the exercise is repeated with all the inter-
viewees who answered the ﬁrst and the last questionnaire. This more than doubles
the number of individuals. Table 13 shows these results.
For both samples, the benchmark model continues to present a statistically sig-
niﬁcant U-shaped age-happiness proﬁle. Most models where age is a quadratic
function continue to exhibit an inverted U-shaped proﬁle, except for the model with
a complete set of cohort and period dummies, which do not show a statistically
signiﬁcant relation between happiness and age. The inﬂexion points remain at very
young ages, so age-happiness proﬁles seem to be decreasing. Using a balanced panel
does not seem to change the nature of the results, contrary to Frijters & Beatton
(2008).
Alternative Estimation Methods: accounting for selection and the ordinal
nature of the happiness variable
Results have also shown that age and time eﬀects are also important and do not
vary collinearly. Given the advantages of a sampling design which exploits age
variation also at the individual level, this section shows the results from ﬁxed eﬀects
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estimation, which accounts both for cohort eﬀects, unobserved heterogeneity and
attrition bias. It also estimates our happiness equation using ordered probit to
account for the ordinal nature of the happiness variable. It further estimates an
ordered ﬁxed-eﬀects logit equation to simultaneously account for both issues. Table
14 shows the results.
Within Groups estimation is carried out. With age deﬁned as in Eq. 2.4, the age
and calendar time no longer grow at the same rate at the individual level, which
makes it possible to estimate age eﬀects separably accounting for period eﬀects,
while cohort eﬀects are removed with the ﬁxed eﬀects. Results change dramatically.
The quadratic speciﬁcation of age, including the additional regressors, now suggests
a clear decreasing age-happiness proﬁle (inﬂexion point of a now decreasing proﬁle
is very high). This result is conﬁrmed by the speciﬁcations which use age dummies.
At the same time, year eﬀects are also statistically signiﬁcant for most years. The
negative proﬁles had already been found in Clark (2002), but he could not separate
year from age eﬀects. These results are conﬁrmed by the ordered ﬁxed eﬀects logit
results. Results do seem to be driven by ﬁxed eﬀects, since our ordered probit
estimation results do not reproduce them. In fact, with the probit estimates, age
does not seem to matter for happiness and cohort eﬀects seem to be negative, which
runs counter to our OLS results from previous sections. So it seems that accounting
for ﬁxed eﬀects reinforces previous results suggesting a decreasing proﬁle, or at best,
an inverted U-shaped proﬁle with a maximum average happiness at relatively young
ages. This suggests that apart from important cohort eﬀects, the estimation of
happiness equations needs to take selective attrition seriously, because results have
more clearly shown a decreasing proﬁle than an inverted-U shape.
2.4.2 Using school year cohorts
Our identiﬁcation strategy does rely on enough variation in the time of the interview
so that we observe enough variation in age within the same birth cohort, for any
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period. The more ﬂexible speciﬁcations render all eﬀects not signiﬁcant, which may
be an indication that the data does not have enough variation. Results have shown
that polynomials of cohort show strong linear eﬀects, which is not captured by cohort
dummies which assume cohort homogeneity within 5 or 10 year intervals. So this
paper invites a sampling design which varies the time of the interview throughout
the periods. This section however proposes an alternative way of measuring cohort
eﬀects which does not rely as much on the sampling design and which is likely
to produce more signiﬁcant results. It will use the cohort deﬁned as the group of
individuals who starts their primary school in the same year. Evidence suggests that
there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences observed in consecutive school cohorts deﬁned this
way (e.g Pischke, 2007). Because this measure of cohort is not linearly dependent
on age and year, using this measure also allows us to use ﬁner data on age and
year. This section shows how results change with this measure of cohort, using the
full speciﬁcation and dummy variables for age, cohort and period. We will then use
ﬁner data on age and time and change their annual frequency to monthly frequency.
Due to the small number of interviews taking place in the second half of each year,
all observations from the second semester have been grouped together. Results are
in Table 15. Using a schooling cohort measure, we conﬁrm that the age-happiness
proﬁle is decreasing. The impact of age and period on happiness become stronger
with this measure of cohort, but the cohort eﬀects themselves are quite negligible.
When we use higher frequency for age and period, cohort eﬀects are more precise and
seem to be positive, but age and period eﬀects disappear. While age and time should
be thought of as continuous, monthly frequency is too high to show any signiﬁcant
eﬀects on happiness, despite accounting for potential ﬂuctuations in happiness which
could repeat themselves annually10. This speciﬁcation had virtually no impact on
the R2 of the model.
10Given the high frequency of age and period, results are not shown in the appendix, but available
upon request.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper revisits the age-happiness proﬁle and focusses speciﬁcally on how the
speciﬁcation of cohort eﬀects impacts on the results. Accounting for age, cohort
and period eﬀects is always a challenge due to their linear dependence. We discuss
the relative merits of alternative speciﬁcations and compare their results. We also
propose an alternative deﬁnition of age which allows for individuals from the same
birth year to be observed in a given year with diﬀerent ages. When data are observed
on a yearly basis, and relying on the fact that not all individuals are born nor
interviewed on the same day, we can observe individuals born in the same year with
two diﬀerent ages in a particular moment. Deﬁning cohort and period the usual
way, but redeﬁning age as completed years of age at the time of the interview breaks
the linear dependence between the three factors. OLS results suggest that average
happiness has an inverted U-shape, with a maximum happiness at young ages. When
ﬁxed eﬀects are included, the estimated age-happiness proﬁle is decreasing. Using
an alternative measure of cohort which groups together individuals who have gone
through their early schooling together reinforces these results. Together these results
show that the U-shaped proﬁle often found when cohorts are omitted is no longer
observed. This implies that cohort eﬀects, even if not always signiﬁcant, can have
a substantial impact on the variable of interest and omitting them or inadequately
accounting for them can render conclusions invalid.
The key element to implement this procedure is having enough variation in the
month of the interview and the recording of individual birthday, preferable the day
of birth which is not however available in this dataset. As long as adequate accounts
of time have been made, spreading interviews throughout the year allows the econo-
metrician to observe two individuals that are exactly the same in everything except
in their number of completed years. Further, interviewing each individual in diﬀer-
ent moments of the year further allows the same individual being observed in two
consecutive years with the same age or a 2-year diﬀerence in age. Moreover, record-
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ing the number of attempts made, before succeeding in contacting the interviewee,
would help identifying the group of people most likely to bias the results.
Skepticals may wonder that whichever way we ﬁnd to account for age, period
and cohort is always arbitrary because in continuous time, these three variables are
still linearly dependent and only non-testable assumptions can allow us to estimate
their impact. The point is that we are redeﬁning age in a way which is not worse
than the usual deﬁnition but has the beneﬁt of allowing us to analyse the linear
eﬀects of three fundamental variables. We ﬁnd that this is a route worth exploring
and interview design should allow this to happen.
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Chapter 3
Costs of domestic violence: a life
satisfaction approach
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Abstract
This paper discusses and estimates the costs of domestic violence using a life sat-
isfaction approach. It draws on a British cross sectional dataset which includes in-
dividual self-reported life satisfaction, household income and experienced domestic
violence, and estimates the costs of domestic violence as the compensating variation
of domestic violence resulting from estimating a life satisfaction regression equa-
tion. Some attempts to account for self-selection into abusive relationships, and
for the endogeneity of household income are discussed and implemented. Results
suggest domestic violence is costed very highly by its victims, with estimates rang-
ing from as little as £1000 up to over £50000. In the aggregate, compensation for
domestic violence accounts for a signiﬁcant percentage of total GDP. Hence this
paper contributes to the literature on valuing non-marketable goods and discusses
the usefulness of a life satisfaction approach when estimating the costs of domestic
violence. It claims that despite its shortcomings, a life satisfaction approach allows
for a valuation of the costs of domestic violence and provides answers often other
valuation methods fail to.
JEL classiﬁcation: D1, I3, J12, O15
Keywords: individual costs of domestic violence, compensating variation, life sat-
isfaction approach.
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3.1 Introduction
One of the major challenges of public policy is to value non-marketed goods and
services, without which governments cannot make informed choices about how to
allocate public spending. The absence of a price determined by a relevant market
means that valuation methods used to estimate the costs of non-marketable goods
and services are fraught with diﬃculty. This paper attempts to estimate the costs
of one such non-marketed good, domestic violence, whose eﬀects on the victims’
integrity, economic outcomes, and mental health are overbearing. It will do so by
estimating the compensating variation of domestic violence resulting from estimating
a life satisfaction regression equation.
There are three main valuation methods of non-marketable goods at the indi-
vidual level, revealed preference methods, hedonic regression, and stated preference
methods. Revealed preference methods have been used, for instance, in Rao et al.
(2003), who estimates the cost of safe sex as the price penalty prostitutes incur
for using condoms with their clients. This method relies on there being a natural
experiment which identiﬁes a counterfactual group of people not exposed to the
same treatment, which may not always exist. Gibbons & Machin (2008) uses a he-
donic regression analysis to estimate the value of public services and school quality.
This method relies on there being a marketable good, such as housing, whose price
changes systematically with the quality of the non-marketed good, in this case both
public services and school quality taken together. As long as house prices are in
equilibrium, as long as houses only diﬀer to the extent that they are located in ar-
eas with diﬀering exposures to the non-marketed good, and as long as the data are
good enough and allow for individual self-selection to be accounted for, house prices
will reﬂect the non-marketed good’s value. The third valuation method often used
in valuation is somewhat diﬀerent. Instead of relying on observed data to reveal
information about the non-marketed good, it asks respondents directly about how
they value it. Stated preference methods have been applied to assess the value of
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diﬀerent types of crime. Atkinson et al. (2005) has estimated that diﬀerent types
of crime can cost each victim up to £36000 in the UK. However, asking individuals
direct questions about their valuation of a speciﬁc good invites strategic responses,
and can give rise to unreﬂective or idiosyncratic answers framed by the particular
context of the question. Moreover, there is evidence that average individual self re-
ported willingness to pay does not often have the same magnitude average individual
willingness to accept (see e.g. Knetsch, 2000).
In the context of domestic violence, its valuation is as important as it is challeng-
ing. Natural experiments which would randomly allocate individuals to diﬀerent in-
cidence levels of domestic violence may be rare if at all possible, and randomised tri-
als which could fabricate such variation are rare (an exception is Hidrobo & Fernald,
2013). Hedonic regressions rely on there being a marketed good whose price changes
with domestic violence, which even if existing, would then require strong assump-
tions in terms of market equilibrium, and large demands on data quality to isolate
the price variation attributed to domestic violence only. Stated preference methods,
despite its limitations, have been used to estimate costs of crime. In England and
Wales, Walby (2004) has estimated the costs of domestic violence at the national
level, following a methodology proposed in Brand & Price (2001). They combine
accounting techniques and stated preference methods to estimate diﬀerent types of
costs. Economic costs were estimated mostly by modeling and costing the relations
crime has with marketed activities, or with outcomes such as industry turnover and
absenteeism, while emotional costs were estimated using stated preference methods
drawing on data from the British Crime Survey (BCS). Brand & Price (2001) esti-
mate that the total cost of crime in England and Wales was 60 billion sterling in
2000. Walby (2004) ﬁnds that the costs of domestic violence alone were 20.06 billion
sterling in 2006/7, out of which 13.88 billion were human and emotional costs.
This paper oﬀers an alternative valuation method of domestic violence. Re-
lying on individual data on self-reported life satisfaction, household income and
experienced domestic violence, it estimates a life satisfaction regression equation
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dependent on income and domestic violence. Individual costs of domestic violence
are derived as its estimated marginal rate of substitution with respect to household
income. While not suﬀering from most of the limitations of more conventional val-
uation methods, it has limitations of its own. This paper assumes self-reported life
satisfaction is a good indicator of utility and is the ultimate variable to maximise.
Sen (1990) argues that self assessments of life in general include adaptation and
levels of resignation which invalidate the use of this variable. Others argue that, be-
cause self-reported satisfaction “is a global retrospective judgement, which in most
cases is constructed only when asked and is determined in part by the respondent’s
own mood and memory, and by the immediate context” (Kahneman & Krueger,
2006), it is inadequate in assessing individual overall well-being, and in comparing
responses across individuals. Despite these drawbacks, there is vast research from
Psychology validating life satisfaction data against more objective measures of emo-
tional state (see e.g. Clark et al., 2006). There is also mounting evidence showing
that the relation between life satisfaction and several important socio-demographic
and economic factors is stable across diﬀerent studies (see e.g Frey & Stutzer, 2002);
and that major events in a lifetime, such as divorce, job loss, or bereavement, often
have permanent eﬀects on one’s life satisfaction (see e.g Lucas et al. (2003) for a
discussion of the impact of transitions in marital status); and that the importance
of diﬀerent domains of life, such as health, intimacy, or material well-being, is also
relatively stable (see e.g Cummins, 1996). This paper assumes that it is reasonable
to make these assumptions and explore the beneﬁts of engaging with life satisfac-
tion data in furthering our understanding of the weight domestic violence has on
well-being.
Estimating consistent estimates of the eﬀect of domestic violence and income on
life satisfaction has additional caveats. To begin with, studies have often found a
weak relation between life satisfaction and income (an example is the seminal work
from Easterlin, 1974, which shows this weak correlation when looking across dif-
ferent countries; but similar evidence has been found when looking at time series
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data for a particular country, and for longitudinal data also). Individuals seem to
adjust to changes in income very quickly and often completely, specially as a re-
sult of positive changes to income (Clark et al., 2006). If the degree of adaptation
and social comparison eﬀects are this strong, then there would not be a monotonic
relation between income and utility, and the compensating variation of domestic vi-
olence would be ill-deﬁned. More recent studies have however shown that, when the
endogeneity of income is accounted for, its eﬀect on life satisfaction in longitudinal
studies is large and more signiﬁcant (see e.g Powdthavee, 2009). Given the limits of
the data, this paper will therefore attempt to account for the endogeneity of income
and argue that adaptation may partly be accounted for by the inclusion of personal-
ity variables. We will include an imputed potential wage and local crime rates based
on postcode information which can partly account for social comparisons, even if no
systematic analysis of social comparisons and reference groups is being made.
It is also very likely that there is endogenous selection of exposure to domestic
violence. Pollak (2002) develops an intergenerational model of domestic violence
which explains the perpetuation of violence in homes where victims have been ex-
posed to and therefore tolerate violence more. Part of the issue has to do with
people conforming to their circumstances and there being personalities which tol-
erate abusive behaviour more than others (e.g Lundberg, 2010, shows how more
agreeable people tend to divorce less). We assume that the personality variables
will signiﬁcantly reduce the impact of this source of bias. Local crime rates also
proxy for exposure to crime and erosion of social norms.
The next section brieﬂy summarises the methodology. Section 3.3 describes the
data, alerting to the challenges that the data available add to this exercise. Section
3.4 presents and discusses the estimation of the marginal utility of income and
violence, while section 3.5 presents the estimates for the individual and aggregate
costs of domestic violence. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Life Satisfaction Approach
Recent years have seen an increased interest in the economic consequences of domes-
tic violence and on its social and private costs. Bowlus & Seitz (2006) shows that
abused women are more likely to divorce and less likely to be employed. With
a dynamic model, it also suggests that once violence has taken place, increas-
ing women’s employment may in fact worsen the incidence of domestic violence.
Morrison & Biehl (1999), in turn, shows how children that have been exposed to
domestic violence tend to underperform at school, making the economic eﬀects of
domestic violence intergenerational and long lasting. Pollak (2002) went one step
further and modeled the propensity to tolerating and perpetrating violence as a func-
tion of previous exposure to violence. He concluded that violence does tend to stay
in families previously exposed to it. Tauchen et al. (1991), Farmer & Tiefenthaler
(1997) and Aizer (2007) ﬁnd that domestic violence is more likely to occur the lower
the economic opportunities of the victims. More recently, Hidrobo & Fernald (2013)
shows that cash transfers received by women in Ecuador decrease domestic violence
for higher education groups, but for lower education groups, it can actually increase
if the woman’s education is at least as high as the man’s. Given that domestic vio-
lence is one of the most costly types of crime and one of the main sources of crime
suﬀered by women in the absence of armed conﬂict, this paper provides an estimate
of the total costs of domestic violence for the victims using a methodology that has
not been used so far.
Our approach assumes self-reported life satisfaction is a good proxy for utility
and estimates a utility function U which depends positively on household income y
and negatively on domestic violence DV . The compensating variation for domestic
violence CV can be obtained by equating utility in a non-violent state 0 with utility
in a violent state 1. U0
(
y0, DV 0
)
= U1
(
y0 + CV,DV 1
)
, CV ≥ 0. With a separable
happiness equation as follows
114
E (Ui|DVi, yi, Xi) = α0 + α1DVi + f (yi) + α′Xi + εi (3.1)
where X represents all additional covariates, CV will solve the equation
E
(
Ui|DVi = 0, f
(
y0i
)
, Xi
)
= E
(
Ui|DVi = 1, f
(
y0i + CV
)
, Xi
)
(3.2)
The most common functional forms used in the literature for the income function
are the linear and the logarithmic forms. Both impose relatively strong assumptions
on the relation between the compensating variation and the level of income. While
the linear form assumes all victims of domestic violence would require on average the
same compensating variation to neutralise the eﬀects of violence, regardless of their
household income, the logarithmic form assumes an increasing relation between CV
and household income1. This paper explores two alternative speciﬁcations, the Box-
Cox transformation and a quadratic function of income. The former nests the linear
and the logarithmic forms and can test whether they are good approximations.
While never used to calculate the costs of domestic violence, this approach un-
derlies the estimation of the tradeoﬀ between unemployment and inﬂation discussed
in Tella et al. (2001). Other applications of this approach now include a valu-
ation of droughts and ﬂoods (Carroll, Frijters & Shields, Carroll et al.), informal
care (van den Berg & i Carbonell, 2007), death of a loved one (Deaton et al., 2009;
Oswald & Powdthavee, 2007), urban renewal (Dolan & Metcalfe, 2008), air quality
(Luechinger, 2009; van Praag & Baarsma, 2001) and terrorism (Frey et al., 2004).
3.3 Data
The main dataset of this paper is discussed in Anand et al. (2009). It was designed
to demonstrate the notion that capabilities can be measured, taking a leap towards
1If f (yi) is linear with parameter α2 in yi, CV equals CV = −α1α2 . If f (yi) = α2 log (yi), CV
equals CV = y0i
(
exp−
α1
α2 −1
)
.
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operationalising Sen (1993)’s capabilities approach. The design of the questionnaire
relied on Nussbaum (2000)’s list of capabilities, and contains a set of 65 capability
indicators together with a rich array of socio-demographic and economic variables.
The survey instrument was delivered in 2005, between the 17th and the 22nd Febru-
ary, to a subsample of approximately 1048 individuals of the UK YouGov database.
It was administered online and it is anonymous. This is, despite its modest size, one
of the few datasets which includes information on experienced violence that does
not come from a self-selected sample of reported victims.
The data set contains two main variables on experienced domestic violence. The
wording of the most robust variable is as follows.
Have you ever been a victim of domestic violence (yes=1/no=0) (Do-
mestic Violence ever)
Victims of domestic violence often do not report incidents either to conform
with social norms, for fear of consequences (Moreno et al., 2005), or because they
may have altruistic preferences for the perpetrators and may not want to expose
them. Because this survey is anonymous and administered online, it is less likely
that respondents will misreport their domestic violence experiences than it is in
other existing data sets. Jarvinen et al. (2008) claims 1 in 4 women will experience
an act of domestic violence in their lifetime. Our data suggest a similar incidence
of domestic violence for women, and a not so negligible incidence for men. Out of
the initial 1048 respondents, 15 people did not provide an answer to this question.
From the 1033 respondents, 22.8% of women report having been a victim of domestic
violence and this percentage is almost 10% for men.
This paper also compared the incidence rates of this data set with the incidence
rates from the self-completed British Crime Survey intimate personal violence (IPV)
module. The IPV module asks two diﬀerent questions about experienced violence.
These questions are asked to all individuals in the sample, men and women, aged
between 16 and 59 years old. The questions list the types of oﬀenses, from verbal
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abuse to sexual abuse, the victim may have suﬀered, and respondents have to select
yes or no to each item individually. It asks about experiences in the last 12 months
prior to the interview, and about experiences since the age of 16. The question
which mirrors more closely our ﬁrst measure of experienced violence is the latter.
In 2009/2010, 15.8% of men reported having been victims of domestic violence and
this number grew to 17% a year later. For women, the percentage of victims varied
from 29.4% and 29.9% in this period (Chaplin et al., 2011). These percentages
are higher than the percentages of our dataset, but this may be due to diﬀerences
in the structure of the questions. The questions in the IPV BCS module, when
changed from a list of oﬀenses to a yes/no question on each type of oﬀense, seems to
have increased the percentage of respondents answering aﬃrmatively (Hall & Smith,
2011). The fact the question in the data set used in this paper is an even coarser
question may justify a slightly lower incidence.
This ﬁrst measure of experienced violence is a bit unclear for the purposes of
our paper because we do not know how long ago or how frequent and severe the
incidents were, nor do we know whether they are still happening. The data set also
includes a measure of vulnerability to domestic violence, which asks respondents to
provide a number from 1 to 7 to represent how vulnerable they feel to future violence
in their home (7 being the most vulnerable).
The actual wording is as follows.
Please indicate how vulnerable you feel to domestic violence in the future
- using a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 means ”not at all vulnerable” and 7
means ”very vulnerable”?
Table 3.1 shows how respondents who report having been victims of domes-
tic violence or not answer the question about vulnerability to domestic violence.
Everyone answered this question. Out of the 174 respondents report having been
victims of domestic violence, only 78 report even the mildest vulnerability to future
domestic violence (an answer larger than 1), and less than 10% reports extreme vul-
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nerability (an answer of at least 6). From the 859 respondents who report no past
incidents with domestic violence, only 52 report a number higher than 2. So while
vulnerability to domestic violence is a more informative measure of how pervasive
this experience is at the time of the interview, the number of people reporting any
vulnerability is rather low. What is more, it makes comparisons between answers
more diﬃcult as there may be more scope for diﬀerent interpretations of the notion
of vulnerability. This paper uses both measures of experienced violence.
Table 3.1: How vulnerable to current and future domestic violence is the sample?
Vulnerability at home Not at al 2 3 4 5 6 Very vulnerable Total
Never victims of DV 711 96 22 15 10 3 2 859
Victims of DV 96 28 12 12 10 11 5 174
Total 807 124 34 27 20 14 7 1,033
For estimation purposes, the vulnerability variable will be collapsed into a binary
variable, which will take the value 1 for all individuals who report vulnerability to
domestic violence at least as high as 4, and 0 otherwise. Using this variable, the
percentage of people who are currently subject to domestic violence is 7.06%, which
represents a 4.90% for men and a 8.81% for women. Table 3.2 shows the percentage
of IPV respondents who said they had been victims of domestic abuse in the last
12 months prior to the survey. This measure of violence is likely to compare more
closely to our measure of vulnerability because on average respondents who have had
recent incidents should also report higher vulnerability. The table shows that the
percentage of women reporting recent experiences varies between 6.4% and 8.2% in
the period 2004-2011, while for men, these percentages vary between 3.6% and 5.8%.
Both IPV and our data set therefore produce similar magnitudes of the incidence of
domestic violence more likely to be included in respondent’s assessment of current
life satisfaction.
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Table 3.2: Percentage of victims of domestic violence in last 12 months
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
Men 5.6 5.5 5.8 5.2 4.0 3.6 4.0
Women 8.1 8.2 7.9 6.9 6.4 6.6 6.4
Source: (Chaplin et al., 2011)
It is well known that what is meant by domestic violence varies across people
of diﬀerent educational and social background, income levels, but mainly, of diﬀer-
ent sex. While domestic violence for women often entails physical abuse, domestic
violence suﬀered by men is almost always of a verbal and emotional nature. Compar-
ing answers between men and women is therefore problematic. However, the small
percentage of men who report experienced domestic violence, makes their separate
analysis more unreliable. This paper presents the results separately just for women,
for men, and for the whole sample.
The self-reported measure of life satisfaction is the answer to the question
How satisﬁed or dissatisﬁed are you with your life as a whole?
The question is clearly aiming at an overall appreciation of one’s life, so it can be
argued that it is a good measure of utility. What is not so clear is what is meant by
life as a whole. It is not clear if it invites an analysis of current life as a whole, or life
as a whole until now. This ambiguity not only adds to measurement error because
diﬀerent respondents may have read the question diﬀerently, but what is perhaps
more worrying, is that it makes the analysis of our coeﬃcients, and the estimation
of the costs of domestic violence much less clear. We have assumed that the answers
represent an integral of how people perceive their lives until now, so that we estimate
the CV as the change in this measure caused by the ﬂow of violence. This question
is asked both at the beginning and at the end of the survey. Several studies (e.g.
Pudney, 2010) show how values of satisfaction vary signiﬁcantly with the location
of the question in the questionnaire. This paper uses the second measure on the
grounds that it should be less subject to idiosyncracies and current mood because
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it comes after the respondents had to reﬂect on several relevant areas of their lives.
This will be our measure of utility.
The income variable included in the data set is gross household income, a more
natural measure of income, specially for women living in traditional households.
The questionnaire includes the following question:
Gross household income is the combined money income of all those earn-
ers in a household including wages, salaries, or rents and BEFORE tax
and contributions to national insurance are deducted. What is your gross
household income?
• 0 - nothing
• £1 to £9, 999 per year (£1 to £199 per week app)
• £10, 000 to £19, 999 per year (£200 to £389 per week app)
• £20, 000 to £29, 999 per year (£390 to £574 per week app)
• £30, 000 to £39, 999 per year (£575 to £774 per week app)
• £40, 000 a year or more (£775 a week or more)
• Prefer not to answer
• Don’t know
Over 4% of respondents said they did not know their household income and
over 10% chose not to answer, so the sample with non-missing household income
reduces to 883 respondents. While income data provided as an interval makes it
more likely respondents will answer truthfully, this study needs a continuous mea-
sure of income. What is more, previous studies have shown that not accounting
for the endogeneity of income in life satisfaction regressions tends to underestimate
the eﬀect of income, and is claimed to be the reason why the estimated relation
between income and life satisfaction is often not statistically signiﬁcant. In this
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paper, this underestimation would lead to an overestimation of the costs of domes-
tic violence. For these two main reasons, the estimation of the marginal utility of
income is the major weakness of this paper. We use two continuous measures of
gross household income based on the gross household income data from the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We replace each income band value, from 1 to 6,
by the BHPS average income in each interval. Layard et al. (2007) uses the mid-
point of each income band instead but, given the positive skewness of the household
income distribution, the mean imputed from a comparable data set can be argued to
be a better starting point. The negative correlation between income and domestic
violence does mean imputation exercises based on a data set without information
on domestic violence is likely to overestimate, on average, the imputed value of
victims of violence, which in turn leads to an overestimation of the compensating
variation of domestic violence, our parameter of interest. Nevertheless, this being
an unconditional average, we argue this may not be a major problem. This measure
of household income will only have 6 distinct values, which is more worrying. For
this reason, we have also used an alternative measure of gross household income
which is an imputed value from the BHPS, after matching individuals between the
BHPS and the dataset in this paper based on observable characteristics. The survey
used was designed using very similar questions to the BHPS, so not only are the
two measures of gross household income comparable, but so are most of the relevant
characteristics. Imputed household income was based on BHPS 2004 wave, and
was estimated by matching observations according to Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Mari-
tal Status, Education Attained, Employment Status, Dependent Children, Religion,
Regional dummies, Individual income brackets. The use of this measure, for over-
estimating the household income of victims of domestic violence, does mean that
our parameter of interest is likely to be overestimated. Section 3.5 will allow us to
compare the results from both measures of income. However, this measure of income
is also less likely to be endogenous. A predicted measure of household income ﬁlters
out many shocks caused by unobserved factors that might simultaneously inﬂuence
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happiness (Luttmer, 2005). This paper will additionally account for factors which
may reduce the simultaneity between income and life satisfaction even further, and
which are often omitted from most surveys. These include a distress index which
is also likely to capture unexpected shocks to income; personality variables which
partly capture the unobserved heterogeneity that explains positive correlations be-
tween happiness and income (and between happiness and experienced violence); and
a predicted log hourly wage, which according to Pollak (2005), is the appropriate
measure to capture outside options in a relationship, and can partially account for
social comparisons and reference groups. Regrettably, this survey does not include
information on spouses.
3.3.1 Domestic Violence in the UK: a few descriptive results
Appendix F shows a summary of all the variables used in this paper. Table 3.3 shows
how the two measures of experienced violence change with the variables used in this
paper. It shows that individuals who have been victims of domestic violence earn
a lower income, both the victim and the household where s\he lives, and are less
happy. It is also quite clear that the measure of violence which captures more recent
experiences has a higher proportion of respondents saying they are completely dis-
satisﬁed than the coarser measure of violence (even if in actual absolute frequencies,
this is a very small number).
Table 3.3: Incidence of domestic violence
Victim of Domestic Violence
Ever Recently
Yes No Yes No
Individual Personal Incomea)
No income 3.82 5.14 4.92 4.86
£1 up to £9, 999 a year 39.49 27.54 39.34 29.36
£10, 000 up to £19, 999 34.39 31.23 34.43 31.45
£20, 000 up to £29, 999 15.29 20.55 13.11 20.00
Continued on next page
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Ever Recently
Yes No Yes No
£30, 000 up to £39, 999 5.10 9.75 6.56 9.02
£40, 000 or more a year 1.91 5.80 1.64 5.32
N 157 759 61 865
a) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.001 0.041
Life Satisfactionb)
Completely Dissatisﬁed 1.15 1.16 5.41 1.03
Very Dissatisﬁed 11.49 4.07 10.81 4.83
Fairly Dissatisﬁed 18.97 10.48 24.32 11.40
Neither Satisﬁed nor Dissatisﬁed 9.77 9.31 16.22 8.83
Fairly Satisﬁed 37.36 43.66 29.73 43.43
Very Satisﬁed 18.97 26.43 10.81 25.98
Completely Satisﬁed 2.30 4.89 2.70 4.52
N 174 859 74 974
b) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.000 0.000
Ethnicityc)
White British 86.47 91.12 88.57 90.51
Non-White British 13.53 8.88 11.43 9.49
N 170 833 70 948
c) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.062 0.597
Educationd)
Other schooling 10.78 8.50 12.12 8.64
Vocational Diploma 34.73 27.09 30.30 28.40
CSE or A Levels 35.93 34.24 39.39 34.02
Graduate 18.56 30.17 18.18 28.94
N 167 812 66 926
d) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.002 0.104
Marital Statuse)
Married or co-habiting 59.77 67.17 52.70 66.43
Separated 18.97 6.52 18.92 8.11
Other living alone 21.26 26.31 28.38 25.46
N 174 859 74 974
e) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.343 0.055
Continued on next page
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Ever Recently
Yes No Yes No
Number of Dependentsf)
None 61.49 70.43 59.46 69.82
At least one dependent 38.51 29.57 40.54 30.18
N 174 859 74 974
f) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.020 0.063
Work Statusg)
Working 52.87 58.91 55.41 57.49
Not working 47.13 41.09 44.59 42.51
N 174 859 74 974
g) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.142 0.726
Gross Household Incomeh)
no income no obs 1.12 1.82 0.86
£1 up to £9, 999 a year 22.30 10.64 20.00 12.39
£10, 000 up to £19, 999 31.76 22.69 40.00 23.31
£20, 000 up to £29, 999 15.54 24.23 14.55 23.19
£30, 000 up to £39, 999 18.24 18.07 12.73 18.28
≥ £40, 000 or more a year 12.16 23.25 10.91 21.96
N 148 714 55 815
h) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.000 0.001
Psychological Distressi)
0 27.59 40.86 21.62 39.73
1 13.22 16.30 10.81 16.02
2 17.82 12.69 12.16 13.55
3 12.64 8.96 8.11 9.65
4 6.90 8.85 12.16 8.32
5 7.47 4.89 10.81 4.93
6 7.47 4.89 17.57 4.62
7 6.90 2.56 6.76 3.18
N 174 859 74 974
i) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.000 0.000
Predicted Hourly Wage Ratej)
Continued on next page
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Ever Recently
Yes No Yes No
Mean Hourly Rate (/hour) 15.30 15.40 13.35 15.47
N 125 517 35 615
j) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.991 0.238
Agek)
Mean age 44.64 44.00 37.89 44.60
N 174 859 74 974
k) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.641 0.000
Crime Ratel)
Mean Crime Rate (number of crimes / 1000 people) 27.32 28.35 28.41 28.13
N 157 764 65 869
l) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.908 0.674
Personality indicators
Extraversionm) 0.16 0.28 0.26 0.25
Agreeablenessn) 0.88 0.67 1.03 0.67
Conscientiousnesso) 0.39 0.29 0.18 0.32
Emotional Stabilityp) 0.35 0.39 0.34 0.38
Opennessq) 0.14 0.26 0.17 0.24
N 174 859 74 974
m) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.061 0.868
n) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.005 0.002
o) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.224 0.183
p) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.354 0.825
q) p-value of Wilcoxon rank-sum equality test 0.066 0.360
While we would expect the average age of victims to be slightly higher, which is
true when we look at all experiences of violence (even if not signiﬁcant), results show
that average age of victims of recent events are likely to be younger than the group
of non-victims. This is a result that has not been exploited in the literature and
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may worth further research. The ethnic composition of victims has more non-Whites
than the composition of non-victims, which conﬁrms ﬁndings stating the incidence
of domestic violence is higher amongst Blacks, Asian and minorities, groups for
whom data and the analysis of the causes and consequences of domestic violence are
even more scarce. This higher incidence of domestic violence amongst non-Whites
may reﬂect characteristics of the households which makes them more vulnerable to
domestic violence, and is no longer signiﬁcant for more recent experiences. For in-
stance, non-White women have on average a larger number of children, and are more
likely to have children and the incidence of domestic violence amongst respondents
with children is highest than amongst those without children. This is in line with
Agarwal (2006), which claims that the number of children deter women more from
leaving a violent relationship. Non-whites are also less educated on average and
the proportion of graduates who are victims is much lower than the proportion of
non-victims.
Marital status is a key variable in this study and reveals somewhat surprising
results. Domestic violence can only occur if the respondent lives with the perpetra-
tor, but evidence does suggest that some of the worst cases of domestic violence, by
which we mean violence inﬂicted by a current or former spouse or family member,
happen to individuals while a relationship breaks down (and just after). We have
grouped individuals according to whether they are living with someone, whether
they are separated, or whether they do not have a partner (singles and widowers).
While most of violent incidents are perpetrated by partners, there is no reason why
individuals without a partner would not be current victims of domestic violence,
also because it can be inﬂicted by other members of the family. The incidence of
domestic violence amongst separated respondents is highest than amongst the re-
maining two groups which may not only reﬂect the fact that respondents may have
terminated an abusive relationship, but also the fact that separation, for whichever
reasons, may have generated violence. The proportion of married respondents who
are victims of violence is lower than those who are not, and this gap is even larger
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for the second measure of violence. And surprisingly, while the proportion of singles
and widowers in the victims’ group of the ﬁrst measure is lower than in the non-
victims’ group, this is reversed when we look at the second measure of violence. This
is another result about which the literature has little to say. On the other hand,
whether or not the respondent is working does not seem to vary systematically with
experienced violence. This is even more so for the second measure of experienced
violence. Given the low content of this variable, we exclude it from our regression
equations.
We follow Pollak (2005)’s suggestion and use the individual predicted wage rate
as a measure of the strength of one’s threat point. This predicted wage rate was
estimated with ﬁxed eﬀects by matching individuals with their BHPS counterparts.
Data from 1998 until 2004 was used and the regressors of the wage equation were
gender, age and age squared, the calendar year, educational attainment, employment
status, marital status, number of dependents, ethnicity, religion and ﬁne regional
data (and so it excludes direct information on experienced violence which is not
captured by income or ﬁxed eﬀects). This measure can also be thought of as a
measure of relative income and social comparisons. Table 3.3 shows that victims of
domestic violence do not seem to have diﬀerent predicted wages from non-victims,
when we look at the ﬁrst measure of violence. However, the diﬀerence between vic-
tims and non-victims increases with the second measure, but is still not statistically
signiﬁcant.
There is evidence that certain personality traits such as being sympathetic or
not being quarrelsome are highly correlated with the presence of domestic violence.
Lundberg (2010) shows that individuals with certain personality traits, such as
agreeableness, are less likely to divorce. Pollak (2002) shows that under plausible
assumptions, there is also a persistent intergenerational impact of domestic violence,
which is partly determined by intergenerational transmission of personality and
upbringing. Based on Gosling et al. (2003), the dataset includes the following ten
questions on individual personality traits:
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1. I see myself as extraverted, enthusiastic (7 point scale: 1=agree strongly 7=dis-
agree strongly)
2. I see myself as reserved, quiet (7 point scale: 1=agree strongly 7=disagree
strongly)
3. I see myself as sympathetic, warm (7 point scale: 1=agree strongly 7=disagree
strongly)
4. I see myself as critical, quarrelsome (7 point scale: 1=agree strongly 7=dis-
agree strongly)
5. I see myself as dependable, self-disciplined (7 point scale: 1=agree strongly
7=disagree strongly)
6. I see myself as disorganised, careless (7 point scale: 1=agree strongly 7=dis-
agree strongly)
7. I see myself as calm, emotionally stable (7 point scale: 1=agree strongly 7=dis-
agree strongly)
8. I see myself as anxious, easily upset (7 point scale: 1=agree strongly 7=dis-
agree strongly)
9. I see myself as open to new experience, complex (7 point scale: 1=agree
strongly 7=disagree strongly)
10. I see myself as conventional, uncreative (7 point scale: 1=agree strongly 7=dis-
agree strongly)
These 10 traits give rise to 5 personality dimensions. Extraversion is the combi-
nation of the ﬁrst two polarised traits, i.e. extraverted and reserved. The negative
trait is given a negative sign and the two are averaged to yield extraversion. The
remaining 4 dimensions result from a similar averaging of two opposite traits, and
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yield agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability and openness. Therefore,
each personality variable takes values from -6 to 6. The table shows the average
value for each personality dimension of both groups of respondents, for both mea-
sures. Victims tend to be more agreeable, conﬁrming the result already found in
Lundberg (2010). Victims also tend to be more psychologically distressed, and this
is also true and very signiﬁcant when we look at the ﬁrst measure of violence. The
index of psychological distress partially captures some of the impact of violence on
life satisfaction we would want to estimate. However, given that omitting this vari-
able may amplify the bias in the coeﬃcient of income, we run regressions with and
without this variable and present both sets of results.
As suggested in Morrison & Biehl (1999), higher violent crime rates lower inhibi-
tions against violent conduct, both via a demonstration eﬀect (emulation of violent
behaviour) and via erosion of social norms that regulate interpersonal relations. This
data set also includes each individual 3-digit postcode, which we use to match each
individual to the crime rate in their neighbourhood (as in Anand & Santos, 2007).
Local crime data were collected online from http://www.crimestatistics.org.uk/tool/.
This variable measures the number of all reported crime oﬀences per 1000 individu-
als in the ﬁrst quarter of 2004. This rate includes all types of assault and not just the
bodily harm oﬀences and was chosen to prevent arbitrary assumptions about which
subcategories of assault do not contribute to erode norms about violence. There is
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the average crime rate between victims and non-victims
for both measures of violence.
3.4 Estimating a Utility function
This paper estimates the costs of domestic violence as the compensating variation
needed to compensate an individual for having experienced violence. The basic life
satisfaction equation and parameter of interest were discussed in Section 3.2, and
summarised in Eqs. 3.1 and 3.2. We next discuss the functional forms chosen for
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household income f (yi) and consequently, for our parameter of interest, CV.
3.4.1 Specifying the relationship between income and utility
While the linear or the logarithmic functions have been used more often, these in-
come speciﬁcations impose strong assumptions on how compensating variation varies
with income. Our preferred speciﬁcation models income as a quadratic function, as
follows:
E (Ui|DVi, yi, Xi) = α0 + α1DVi + α2yi + α3y2i + α
′
Xi + εi (3.3)
CV calculated as Eq. 3.4 shows:
CV = −
(
y0 +
α2
2α3
)⎡⎢⎢⎣1±
√√√√1− α1
α3
(
y0 +
α2
2α3
)2
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ (3.4)
CV depends on the parameters α1, α2 and α3, and on the initial income level.
We will choose the root where utility is increasing in income, which for a concave
function, is also the lowest root. As long as this lowest root is positive and where
most of our values of income and utility lie, this is the most well-behaved scenario.
We discuss our results when estimates deviate from this relation.
We have made attempts to use a Box-Cox function as an alternative speciﬁcation,
and to test for the strength of the linear and the logarithmic speciﬁcations of income,
often used in the literature. The estimation results using the male sample only are
very imprecise, which decreases the power of the tests. For the female sample, we
seem to ﬁnd some support for the linear speciﬁcation using the point estimate of
income measure. When we move to imputed income, this evidence becomes much
stronger. Broadly, when we move to the second measure of income, the predicted
income values, standard errors and statistical signiﬁcance improve and shows us
that the linear speciﬁcation continues to receive stronger support for the female
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sample, and the λ point estimate is now much closer to 1. All estimates of λ are
not larger than 1, which suggests an independent or increasing relation between CV
and income. The following table summarises the results obtained for the Box Cox
speciﬁcation of income2.
Table 3.4: Testing for alternative speciﬁcations of income in the life satisfaction
equation: results from Box Cox speciﬁcation, parameter λ
Domestic Violence ever Domestic Violence recently
All Women Men All Women Men
Using point estimate of household income
λ coeﬃcient 1.457 2.924 0.108 1.318 2.571 0.118
λ standard error (0.766) (1.705) (0.589) (0.747) (1.599) (0.621)
p-value H0 : λ = 0 0.008 0.001 0.852 0.018 0.004 0.847
p-value H0 : λ = 1 0.497 0.066 0.210 0.642 0.140 0.242
Using predicted household income
λ coeﬃcient 0.429 0.986 -0.143 0.389 0.923 -0.162
λ standard error (0.297) (0.430) (0.360) (0.303) (0.445) (0.371)
p-value H0 : λ = 0 0.147 0.026 0.690 0.199 0.047 0.662
p-value H0 : λ = 1 0.085 0.975 0.009 0.071 0.864 0.010
These results seem to suggest a linear speciﬁcation is appropriate for the female
sample. When looking at the whole sample, results are also consistent with a log-
arithmic speciﬁcation of income. Given that the ﬁrst measure of income only has
six distinct points, we think the results of the second measure may be more infor-
mative, despite the overestimation of victims’ income. But given the weakness of
the evidence, and how it varies with the income measure and regression used, we
will present our estimation results using the quadratic function of income, a linear
in parameters model which requires lower demands on the income data.
2When the distress index was removed, and given the negative impact it has on happiness and
the negative correlation it has with household income (around -0.08), estimates decreased. Results
also became less precise and the power of the tests decreased slightly. Qualitatively results did not
change though and will not be presented here.
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3.4.2 Estimation results of life satisfaction equation
Table 3.5 shows the estimation results of life satisfaction equations deﬁned according
to Eq. 3.3. We present results for both measures of income (income point estimates
in the ﬁrst 6 columns, and predicted income for the last 6 columns), and for both
measures of experienced violence (recent experiences in columns 4-6 and 10-12, and
experiences over entire life span in columns 1-3 and 7-9). And we estimate our life
satisfaction equation for the whole sample (columns 1, 4, 7, 10), women (columns
2, 5, 8, 11) and men (columns 3, 6, 9, 12).
The socio-demographic indicators used are explained in Appendix F. We include
a gender dummy, a quadratic function of age, marital status, ethnicity, presence
of dependents and education. To account for the endogeneity of domestic violence
and the self-selection of victims into abusive relations, we use personality indicators,
and a measure of outside options, the log hourly wage predicted from BHPS. We
also use local crime rates which account for norms related to violence and quality
of public services. To account for the endogeneity of household income, we also use
the distress index, which should reﬂect the shocks to utility that lead individuals
to revise their income generating decisions. Potential wage can partly also account
for the importance social comparisons and reference groups have for individuals.
However, because distress partly captures the impact of violence this study aims to
estimate, it is likely that its inclusion underestimates the eﬀects of violence on life
satisfaction. We also exclude this variable to assess how results change in Table 3.6.
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Using either measure, domestic violence has a signiﬁcantly pervasive impact
on life satisfaction for women. The eﬀect is not signiﬁcant for men with the ﬁrst
measure, but becomes as large and signiﬁcant when violence only measures recent
events. So despite the fact that the nature of the violence suﬀered by men may be
diﬀerent and often leads to diﬀerent behavioural responses which could be argued to
lead to adaptation and undermine this estimation exercise, evidence seems to suggest
this is not the case when the violence measure relates to recent events. Results do
not vary greatly with the measure of income used. When we exclude the distress
index, magnitudes of the impact of violence do increase, but signiﬁcance patterns
remain the same.
Gross Household income increases life satisfaction at a decreasing rate for men,
but the pattern that seems to be emerging for women is much less precise. When
using the income point estimate, and for both measures of violence, we obtain a
convex relation with increasing returns, but this pattern disappears for the imputed
income measure. When we include distress in Table 3.5, there does not seem any
relation at all between income and life satisfaction, but when we exclude the distress
index in Table 3.6, the estimated relationship is linear. This weaker impact of income
on women’s assessments of current life than men’s assessment is already documented
in the literature, but it does raise concerns about the validity of this methodology.
We will present the estimates of the costs of domestic violence only for the regression
equations where this impact was signiﬁcant.
136
T
a
b
le
3
.6
:
H
ap
p
in
es
s
eq
u
at
io
n
s:
ex
cl
u
d
in
g
d
is
tr
es
s
in
d
ex
In
c
o
m
e
:
P
o
in
t
e
st
im
a
te
In
c
o
m
e
:
P
r
e
d
ic
te
d
in
c
o
m
e
D
o
m
e
st
ic
V
io
le
n
c
e
e
v
e
r
D
o
m
e
st
ic
V
io
le
n
c
e
r
e
c
e
n
tl
y
D
o
m
e
st
ic
V
io
le
n
c
e
e
v
e
r
D
o
m
e
st
ic
V
io
le
n
c
e
r
e
c
e
n
tl
y
A
ll
W
o
m
e
n
M
e
n
A
ll
W
o
m
e
n
M
e
n
A
ll
W
o
m
e
n
M
e
n
A
ll
W
o
m
e
n
M
e
n
D
o
m
es
ti
c
V
io
le
n
ce
-0
.3
7
7
*
*
*
-0
.3
8
1
*
*
-0
.3
5
7
-1
.0
1
8
*
*
*
-1
.1
3
1
*
*
*
-0
.9
0
3
*
*
-0
.3
3
7
*
*
*
-0
.3
2
0
*
-0
.3
2
9
-0
.9
4
9
*
*
*
-1
.0
1
9
*
*
*
-0
.9
2
4
*
*
(0
.1
3
1
)
(0
.1
6
6
)
(0
.2
2
5
)
(0
.2
1
6
)
(0
.2
8
0
)
(0
.3
6
0
)
(0
.1
2
9
)
(0
.1
6
6
)
(0
.2
1
8
)
(0
.2
1
4
)
(0
.2
7
7
)
(0
.3
5
7
)
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
in
co
m
e/
1
0
0
0
0
0
.1
1
3
-0
.1
1
0
0
.4
7
6
*
*
0
.1
3
8
-0
.0
3
3
0
.4
2
0
*
0
.2
5
6
*
*
*
0
.1
8
8
*
0
.3
4
6
*
*
*
0
.2
5
9
*
*
*
0
.2
0
4
*
0
.3
3
5
*
*
*
(0
.1
3
6
)
(0
.1
8
4
)
(0
.2
1
7
)
(0
.1
3
4
)
(0
.1
8
0
)
(0
.2
1
7
)
(0
.0
7
4
)
(0
.1
1
0
)
(0
.1
0
6
)
(0
.0
7
3
)
(0
.1
0
8
)
(0
.1
0
5
)
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
in
co
m
e/
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
4
4
*
-0
.0
4
3
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
3
2
-0
.0
3
6
-0
.0
1
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
2
2
*
*
-0
.0
1
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
2
1
*
*
(0
.0
1
8
)
(0
.0
2
5
)
(0
.0
2
9
)
(0
.0
1
8
)
(0
.0
2
5
)
(0
.0
2
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
F
em
a
le
0
.2
3
0
*
*
0
.1
8
7
*
0
.2
5
8
*
*
0
.2
2
2
*
*
(0
.1
0
2
)
(0
.1
0
0
)
(0
.1
0
2
)
(0
.1
0
0
)
a
g
e
-0
.1
7
9
*
*
*
-0
.1
5
9
*
*
-0
.2
0
9
*
*
*
-0
.1
8
2
*
*
*
-0
.1
7
4
*
*
-0
.1
9
5
*
*
-0
.1
8
6
*
*
*
-0
.1
7
5
*
*
-0
.2
0
4
*
*
*
-0
.1
9
0
*
*
*
-0
.1
8
9
*
*
*
-0
.1
9
0
*
*
(0
.0
5
0
)
(0
.0
7
1
)
(0
.0
7
8
)
(0
.0
4
9
)
(0
.0
6
9
)
(0
.0
7
8
)
(0
.0
5
0
)
(0
.0
7
1
)
(0
.0
7
8
)
(0
.0
4
9
)
(0
.0
6
9
)
(0
.0
7
7
)
a
g
e2
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
S
ep
a
ra
te
d
-0
.0
8
8
-0
.0
7
2
-0
.1
6
6
-0
.0
6
9
-0
.0
1
4
-0
.2
1
2
-0
.0
4
4
-0
.0
1
4
-0
.1
7
6
-0
.0
1
4
0
.0
4
9
-0
.2
0
3
(0
.1
7
4
)
(0
.2
3
7
)
(0
.2
7
0
)
(0
.1
6
9
)
(0
.2
3
0
)
(0
.2
6
3
)
(0
.1
7
3
)
(0
.2
3
9
)
(0
.2
6
7
)
(0
.1
6
8
)
(0
.2
3
2
)
(0
.2
6
1
)
N
o
p
a
rt
n
er
-0
.4
2
2
*
*
*
-0
.2
8
7
-0
.5
5
7
*
*
-0
.4
5
3
*
*
*
-0
.3
0
8
-0
.6
0
7
*
*
*
-0
.3
9
0
*
*
*
-0
.2
7
1
-0
.5
2
9
*
*
-0
.4
2
0
*
*
*
-0
.2
9
4
-0
.5
7
6
*
*
(0
.1
4
8
)
(0
.2
0
2
)
(0
.2
3
3
)
(0
.1
4
7
)
(0
.2
0
0
)
(0
.2
3
2
)
(0
.1
4
7
)
(0
.2
0
3
)
(0
.2
3
2
)
(0
.1
4
6
)
(0
.2
0
1
)
(0
.2
3
0
)
N
o
n
-W
h
it
e
B
ri
ti
sh
-0
.1
0
0
0
.0
0
5
-0
.2
1
4
-0
.1
6
3
-0
.0
4
4
-0
.2
9
6
-0
.1
0
0
-0
.0
1
8
-0
.2
4
4
-0
.1
3
6
-0
.0
2
0
-0
.3
2
4
(0
.1
8
7
)
(0
.2
5
8
)
(0
.2
8
8
)
(0
.1
8
5
)
(0
.2
5
6
)
(0
.2
8
4
)
(0
.1
8
4
)
(0
.2
5
5
)
(0
.2
8
5
)
(0
.1
8
3
)
(0
.2
5
2
)
(0
.2
8
1
)
A
t
le
a
st
1
ch
il
d
0
.1
7
6
0
.2
5
2
0
.0
6
0
0
.2
2
8
*
0
.3
2
4
*
0
.0
7
6
0
.1
8
3
0
.2
6
4
0
.0
5
1
0
.2
3
6
*
*
0
.3
3
7
*
0
.0
7
3
(0
.1
1
9
)
(0
.1
7
8
)
(0
.1
7
2
)
(0
.1
1
8
)
(0
.1
7
6
)
(0
.1
7
1
)
(0
.1
1
9
)
(0
.1
7
8
)
(0
.1
7
1
)
(0
.1
1
8
)
(0
.1
7
6
)
(0
.1
6
9
)
V
o
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
d
ip
lo
m
a
0
.0
7
3
0
.1
5
8
-0
.1
4
1
0
.0
8
9
0
.2
1
8
-0
.1
6
9
0
.0
5
6
0
.1
3
8
-0
.1
2
5
0
.0
6
9
0
.1
9
3
-0
.1
7
0
(0
.1
8
4
)
(0
.2
7
3
)
(0
.2
5
8
)
(0
.1
8
2
)
(0
.2
6
8
)
(0
.2
5
7
)
(0
.1
8
4
)
(0
.2
7
3
)
(0
.2
5
6
)
(0
.1
8
1
)
(0
.2
6
8
)
(0
.2
5
4
)
C
S
E
A
le
v
el
0
.1
3
5
0
.1
4
7
-0
.0
1
7
0
.1
3
7
0
.1
4
8
0
.0
0
2
0
.1
1
1
0
.1
2
0
-0
.0
0
4
0
.1
0
5
0
.1
1
4
-0
.0
0
1
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
p
a
g
e
137
In
c
o
m
e
:
P
o
in
t
e
st
im
a
te
In
c
o
m
e
:
P
r
e
d
ic
te
d
in
c
o
m
e
D
o
m
e
st
ic
V
io
le
n
c
e
e
v
e
r
D
o
m
e
st
ic
V
io
le
n
c
e
r
e
c
e
n
tl
y
D
o
m
e
st
ic
V
io
le
n
c
e
e
v
e
r
D
o
m
e
st
ic
V
io
le
n
c
e
r
e
c
e
n
tl
y
A
ll
W
o
m
e
n
M
e
n
A
ll
W
o
m
e
n
M
e
n
A
ll
W
o
m
e
n
M
e
n
A
ll
W
o
m
e
n
M
e
n
(0
.1
8
4
)
(0
.2
6
5
)
(0
.2
7
0
)
(0
.1
8
1
)
(0
.2
5
8
)
(0
.2
6
7
)
(0
.1
8
3
)
(0
.2
6
4
)
(0
.2
6
7
)
(0
.1
8
0
)
(0
.2
5
7
)
(0
.2
6
5
)
G
ra
d
u
a
te
0
.1
0
1
0
.1
0
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.1
2
5
0
.1
6
5
-0
.0
3
5
0
.0
9
7
0
.0
9
6
0
.0
1
0
0
.1
1
5
0
.1
5
2
-0
.0
3
3
(0
.1
9
0
)
(0
.2
7
9
)
(0
.2
7
1
)
(0
.1
8
7
)
(0
.2
7
3
)
(0
.2
7
0
)
(0
.1
8
9
)
(0
.2
7
7
)
(0
.2
7
0
)
(0
.1
8
7
)
(0
.2
7
2
)
(0
.2
6
8
)
E
x
tr
av
er
si
o
n
0
.3
2
4
*
*
*
0
.2
7
3
*
*
*
0
.3
7
2
*
*
*
0
.3
1
7
*
*
*
0
.2
5
8
*
*
*
0
.3
8
3
*
*
*
0
.3
2
1
*
*
*
0
.2
6
7
*
*
*
0
.3
6
9
*
*
*
0
.3
1
6
*
*
*
0
.2
5
1
*
*
*
0
.3
8
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
6
6
)
(0
.0
9
3
)
(0
.0
9
8
)
(0
.0
6
5
)
(0
.0
9
1
)
(0
.0
9
7
)
(0
.0
6
5
)
(0
.0
9
3
)
(0
.0
9
6
)
(0
.0
6
4
)
(0
.0
9
1
)
(0
.0
9
5
)
A
g
re
ea
b
le
n
es
s
-0
.0
9
5
*
-0
.1
0
6
-0
.0
8
5
-0
.0
8
6
-0
.0
7
3
-0
.1
0
0
-0
.1
0
5
*
-0
.1
2
1
-0
.0
8
9
-0
.0
9
2
*
-0
.0
8
3
-0
.1
0
1
(0
.0
5
6
)
(0
.0
8
1
)
(0
.0
7
9
)
(0
.0
5
5
)
(0
.0
8
0
)
(0
.0
7
7
)
(0
.0
5
5
)
(0
.0
8
1
)
(0
.0
7
8
)
(0
.0
5
5
)
(0
.0
8
0
)
(0
.0
7
7
)
C
o
n
sc
ie
n
ti
o
u
sn
es
s
0
.1
1
4
*
0
.1
3
4
0
.0
7
1
0
.1
0
2
*
0
.1
0
2
0
.0
7
7
0
.1
2
0
*
*
0
.1
6
6
*
0
.0
7
6
0
.1
0
6
*
0
.1
2
9
0
.0
7
7
(0
.0
5
9
)
(0
.0
8
4
)
(0
.0
8
5
)
(0
.0
5
8
)
(0
.0
8
2
)
(0
.0
8
4
)
(0
.0
5
8
)
(0
.0
8
4
)
(0
.0
8
4
)
(0
.0
5
7
)
(0
.0
8
2
)
(0
.0
8
3
)
E
m
o
ti
o
n
a
l
st
a
b
il
it
y
-0
.0
2
5
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
3
2
-0
.0
3
2
0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
1
5
-0
.0
0
6
0
.0
1
0
(0
.0
6
1
)
(0
.0
8
8
)
(0
.0
8
9
)
(0
.0
6
1
)
(0
.0
8
8
)
(0
.0
8
8
)
(0
.0
6
1
)
(0
.0
8
7
)
(0
.0
8
9
)
(0
.0
6
1
)
(0
.0
8
7
)
(0
.0
8
8
)
O
p
en
n
es
s
0
.0
6
1
0
.1
2
7
-0
.0
3
4
0
.0
8
0
0
.1
4
2
*
-0
.0
1
4
0
.0
6
1
0
.1
2
7
-0
.0
3
6
0
.0
7
8
0
.1
3
9
*
-0
.0
1
6
(0
.0
5
6
)
(0
.0
7
9
)
(0
.0
8
3
)
(0
.0
5
6
)
(0
.0
7
8
)
(0
.0
8
3
)
(0
.0
5
6
)
(0
.0
8
0
)
(0
.0
8
3
)
(0
.0
5
6
)
(0
.0
7
8
)
(0
.0
8
2
)
P
re
d
ic
te
d
lo
g
h
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
0
.2
7
7
*
0
.1
5
0
0
.4
7
9
*
0
.2
3
8
*
0
.1
0
9
0
.4
3
9
*
0
.2
7
7
*
0
.1
8
0
0
.4
6
3
*
0
.2
4
8
*
0
.1
4
5
0
.4
1
9
*
(0
.1
4
6
)
(0
.1
9
1
)
(0
.2
4
8
)
(0
.1
4
1
)
(0
.1
8
3
)
(0
.2
4
7
)
(0
.1
4
6
)
(0
.1
9
2
)
(0
.2
4
5
)
(0
.1
4
1
)
(0
.1
8
4
)
(0
.2
4
4
)
L
o
ca
l
cr
im
e
ra
te
s
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
3
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
7
.4
9
6
*
*
*
7
.4
4
1
*
*
*
7
.8
2
4
*
*
*
7
.5
2
9
*
*
*
7
.6
7
2
*
*
*
7
.6
4
3
*
*
*
7
.4
5
7
*
*
*
7
.4
2
0
*
*
*
7
.8
6
9
*
*
*
7
.5
4
2
*
*
*
7
.6
6
4
*
*
*
7
.6
4
0
*
*
*
(1
.1
1
1
)
(1
.5
4
3
)
(1
.7
3
0
)
(1
.0
8
9
)
(1
.5
0
4
)
(1
.7
1
9
)
(1
.1
0
6
)
(1
.5
5
2
)
(1
.7
0
2
)
(1
.0
8
4
)
(1
.5
1
1
)
(1
.6
9
0
)
R
2
0
.1
7
9
0
.1
4
1
0
.2
0
8
0
.1
9
9
0
.1
7
1
0
.2
2
0
0
.1
7
2
0
.1
2
0
0
.2
1
2
0
.1
9
2
0
.1
5
2
0
.2
2
6
N
5
7
7
3
1
0
2
6
7
5
8
5
3
1
8
2
6
7
5
8
6
3
1
6
2
7
0
5
9
4
3
2
4
2
7
0
S
ig
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
s
:
∗
1
0
%
∗∗
5
%
∗∗
∗
1
%
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
O
m
it
te
d
ca
te
g
o
ri
es
:
b
ei
n
g
a
m
a
n
,
m
a
rr
ie
d
,
o
th
er
sc
h
o
o
li
n
g
,
lo
w
er
re
la
ti
v
e
in
co
m
e,
W
h
it
e
B
ri
ti
sh
,
n
o
d
ep
en
d
en
ts
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
o
f
in
co
m
e
m
u
lt
ip
li
ed
b
y
1
0
0
0
0
.
138
As observed in so many previous studies, women are happier than men, the age-
happiness proﬁle is U-shaped, and having no partner is the worst marital status
on average (exception is for the female equations estimated without the distress
index). Having dependents increases life satisfaction for women on average, and
this is never signiﬁcant for men. Education does not seem to have a signiﬁcant
impact on happiness, also in line with previous studies. Personality does have a
signiﬁcant impact on life satisfaction, specially extroversion and conscientiousness.
More extrovert and more conscientious respondents report higher life satisfaction.
Potential wage is very signiﬁcant and contributes to higher life satisfaction for men,
but again these results are not signiﬁcant for women. Being distressed does have
a major impact on life satisfaction for all 12 equations in Table 3.5, similar in
magnitude to the detrimental eﬀects of violence itself. However, excluding this
variable, even if it increased the eﬀect of violence, did not substantially alter the
remaining coeﬃcients, not even the income coeﬃcients to a large extent.
3.5 Estimating the costs of domestic violence at
the individual and at the national level
Table 3.7 shows our estimates of the compensating variation of domestic violence
according to Eq. 3.4. These will not be calculated when the impact of income is not
signiﬁcant. When the quadratic term is not signiﬁcant, CV is estimated according
to a linear model.
Costs of DV vary from as little as £1000 to over £50000. When the life satis-
faction equation exhibits an increasing but concave proﬁle of income, estimates of
CV tend to be lower than when the quadratic term (or the linear term) is not sig-
niﬁcant, which does suggest there is still some work to be done for extreme income
values. While the linear model may be overestimating the impact of income changes
at extreme values, the quadratic function may be overﬁtting and underestimating
139
it. These results are not far oﬀ from the results obtained in Atkinson et al. (2005).
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To compute a national estimate of the costs of domestic violence, the ﬁrst step
was to estimate the number of victims in the UK in 2005, the year this questionnaire
was delivered. We used the proportion of victims in our sample as a measure of
incidence of domestic violence in the whole of the UK (Scotland included). Then we
used the estimates of the UK population available in Dye & Sosimi (2006) (over 60
million in 2005, p. 40) to ﬁnd the number of victims of domestic violence in the UK in
2005. National costs of domestic violence are calculated as the product of number
of victims and the individual costs of DV (Table 3.7, row 1). Results are in the
second row of the table and show national costs as high as £billion 146, but for the
whole sample, never exceeding £billion 39. With a GDP of approximately £million
1,224,715 for the whole UK in 2005 (Dye & Sosimi, 2006, , p. 23), this estimate
represents over 3% of the national GDP, in line with the percentage suggested in
Walby (2004). Surprisingly, and because the percentage of individuals who feel
vulnerable to domestic violence is lower than the percentage of individuals who
have ever experienced domestic violence, the estimates of the national costs of DV
are similar for the two measures of DV.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper provides an estimate of the costs of domestic violence at the individual
and at the aggregate level. It uses a life satisfaction equation where compensating
variation is a function of the coeﬃcients of income and domestic violence. It draws
on a survey that includes data on experienced violence, household gross income
and a self-reported life satisfaction variable. The analysis is conditional on socio-
demographic characteristics, potential wage, a distress index, personality and local
crime rates. We use personality indicators, potential wage and local crime rates to
account for the endogeneity of domestic violence and the self-selection of victims
into abusive relations. To account for the endogeneity of household income, we also
use the distress index, which should reﬂect the shocks to utility that lead individuals
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to revise their income generating decisions.
This paper shows that a satisfaction approach produces estimates which are in
line with estimates produced using stated preference methods, as in Atkinson et al.
(2005). However, when we use a measure of domestic violence which aims to repre-
sent current exposure to domestic violence, we obtain higher individual costs than
other studies. In the end, our results conﬁrm that domestic violence is a major
inhibitor of individual and social welfare, and compensating victims of domestic vi-
olence would cost the UK government up to over 3% of its annual GDP. It is worth
emphasising the sensitivity of our estimates to the gender of the respondent, and
the sensitivity of the self-reported satisfaction variable to numerous inﬂuences. This
approach is limited by the possibility that either violence or income not being a sub-
stantial part of each respondent’s satisfaction. However, it overcomes fundamental
limitations of other valuation methods, such as the need to have relevant markets in
equilibrium and the incentive to reply strategically. In particular, given that most
of the costs of domestic violence are held in private, and are likely to be emotional
and human costs for which there are no relevant markets, this approach is, in our
view, worth exploring further.
At the same time, there are still reasons to believe that the marginal disutility
of violence is underestimated. Self-reported satisfaction will fail to capture the
cost of public goods which are unperceived or not valued by the individual or the
intergenerational eﬀects of domestic violence, so this measure only captures the
costs of domestic violence perceived and understood by the victims. This paper
however invites an integrated cost-beneﬁt analysis of domestic violence which takes
satisfaction approaches to valuing non-market goods seriously, and shows how urgent
this may be for a clearer assessment of the true impact of domestic violence and for
a stronger eﬀective support of families where domestic violence occurs.
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Appendix A
Comparing the PSID with the CPS: wage distribution and average hours
of work over the lifecycle
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Appendix B
Black male and female average ﬁxed eﬀects over the lifecourse
Section 1.3.2 showed how average ﬁxed eﬀects between White workers and the
total sample were not very diﬀerent, and so selection into employment, albeit signif-
icant when comparing workers and non-workers average ﬁxed eﬀects, does not have
a strong impact. These proﬁles were computed using a diﬀerent set of individuals
for diﬀerent ages, either because individuals dropped the panel, or because the age
range we are trying to estimate is longer than the sample period and only individ-
uals from diﬀerent cohorts can be used to build the whole proﬁle. This appendix
shows the ﬁgures for the Black groups which demonstrate the relative importance
of selection and attrition we analysed in the paper for the White groups. Qualita-
tively, the results are the same, even if for College groups, attritors do not seem to
be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from observed individuals.
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Figure 4: How diﬀerent are workers from non-workers: Fixed eﬀects of Black men
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Figure 5: How diﬀerent are workers from non-workers: Fixed eﬀects of Black women
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Table 8: Testing for selective employment and attrition: Blacks
H0 : FEw − FENw = 0 H0 : FEobs − FEatr = 0 H0 : FEw − FEexc.w = 0
χ2 p-value χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
High School Black men
1979-1985 233.1 0 156.8 0 289.5 0
1986-1992 308.1 0 237.7 0 359.2 0
College Black men
1979-1985 123.4 0 54.9 0.06 177.8 0
1986-1992 230.6 0 187.5 0 277.1 0
High School Black women
1979-1985 401.2 0 102.8 0 449.5 0
1986-1992 276.4 0 213.1 0 295.7 0
College Black women
1979-1985 242.4 0 24.5 0.97 272.6 0
1986-1992 209.2 0 91.2 0 212.1 0
Results based on the χ2 test (Rϕ) (RCovR′)−1 (Rϕ)′ ∼ χ2q, where ϕ is the vector of estimated ﬁxed eﬀects
R is the projection matrix that transforms the ﬁxed eﬀects into a diﬀerence in means between two groups
Cov is the covariance matrix of the ﬁxed eﬀects
and q is the number of restrictions, one for each age level.
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Figure 6: Attrition rates for Blacks %
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Figure 7: How diﬀerent are attritors from those who stay: Fixed eﬀects of Black
men
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Figure 8: How diﬀerent are attritors from those who stay: Fixed eﬀects of Black
women
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Figure 9: Average ﬁxed eﬀects by cohort 1919-1966
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Appendix C
Estimated proﬁles correcting for attrition and cohort eﬀects
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Figure 10: Accounting for attrition: Age-earnings proﬁles 1979-1985 using missing
observations
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Figure 11: Accounting for attrition: Age-earnings proﬁles 1986-1992 using missing
observations
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Figure 12: Accounting for attrition and cohort eﬀects: Age-earnings proﬁles using
NLSY and including missing observations
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Appendix D
Intertemporal models with ﬂexible labour supply
Section 1.5 showed the participation rates, hours of work and wage proﬁles sim-
ulated by three diﬀerent lifecycle models with ﬂexible labour supply. Here we show
and discuss the detailed results of these simulations.
The basic intertemporal model with ﬂexible labour
supply
The following ﬁgures show the consumption, wealth and leisure proﬁles simulated
for individuals with diﬀerent productivity, conditional on wealth, for the basic model
where wages are both exogenous and deterministic. Proﬁles of all eight groups are
presented. For most groups, work tracks the wage schedule, as predicted in Heckman
(1974a). Exception is to be made to the group with the highest wage levels, the
College White men group, for whom leisure increases throughout the period, at an
even higher rate once wages start decreasing, even though they always participate
in the labour market. Those who do not participate in the labour market are the
lowest earners, higher wealth individuals, typically the case of second earners as
discussed in Neal (2004).
This tracking of wages is also observed in consumption. While wages are increas-
ing, individual consumption is growing but after wages begin to fall, consumption
growth slows down, stagnates or is reversed depending on the group. For the College
White male group, consumption growth remains constant and for the group facing
a wage constant negative wage growth rate (White College women), consumption
decreases over the life course for low initial wage levels, but high enough wage levels
allow for an initial consumption growth or even an increasing proﬁle all along. This
is achieved at the cost of large number of hours of work earlier in life and a sharp
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run down of wealth after an initial stock up. For the two groups facing very high
wage growth rates (both High School Black groups), the cost of accumulating debt
is so low that they it is used to fund steeply increasing consumption proﬁles earlier
in life, and low labour market attachment.
In summary, the intertemporal substitution of leisure discussed in Heckman
(1974a) is very strong in this model. Because individuals can change their labour
supply hours, they choose to work longer hours when wages are higher. Those who
have high wealth and low wages choose not to participate. Even though consump-
tion and leisure are complements, these simulations showed consumption increasing
when leisure is decreasing, i.e when wages are growing. This is probably due to low
discounting. This model does not explain the decreasing participation observed in
the data, unless the wage proﬁle is decreasing, which is diﬃcult to reconcile with
human capital theories. It suggests discounting and having hours of work tracking
wages are the two main drivers of participation decisions.
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Figure 13: Consumption proﬁles in the basic model
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Figure 14: Leisure proﬁles in the basic model
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Figure 15: Wealth proﬁles in the basic model
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The intertemporal model with ﬂexible labour sup-
ply and deterministic endogenous wages
The following ﬁgures show the consumption, wealth and leisure proﬁles simulated for
individuals with diﬀerent productivity, conditional on wealth, for the model where
wages are endogenous and deterministic. Proﬁles of all eight groups are presented.
Consumption increases throughout the life course for all groups, except for low
wage College White women who face no returns to experience in this simulation
(their proﬁles are ﬂat). These increasing proﬁles are ﬁnanced diﬀerently by diﬀerent
groups. Groups facing a reasonably high wage growth rate will incur debt to ﬁnance
consumption, while White College men and women will give up on leisure earlier in
life.
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Figure 16: Consumption proﬁles in the model with deterministic endogenous wages
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Figure 17: Leisure proﬁles in the model with deterministic endogenous wages
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Figure 18: Wealth proﬁles in the model with deterministic endogenous wages
174
The intertemporal model with ﬂexible labour sup-
ply and stochastic exogenous wages
The following ﬁgures show the consumption, wealth and leisure proﬁles simulated for
individuals with diﬀerent productivity, conditional on wealth, for the model where
wages are exogenous and stochastic. Proﬁles of all eight groups are presented. We
generated a sequence of 40 random shocks to wages for each of 5000 individuals
within each group. At the end of each period, a shock to the wage occurs, which
translates into a shock to the wealth stock available at the beginning of the next
period. The proﬁles represent the average optimal consumption and leisure choices
made by these 5000 individuals who experience diﬀerent wage trajectories, and the
wealth resulting from these choices. Consumption proﬁles are fairly ﬂat, almost
always decreasing until wage shocks become riskier. Then consumption suﬀers a
drop and comes back up again at the end of life, when uncertainty is dissipated
and the wealth buﬀer against shocks is no longer needed. For very high earners,
consumption increases throughout the life course, but at a slower rate than wealth
accumulates. These individuals, unless their high wage growth rates oﬀset the risk of
a negative shock, stock up huge wealth which peaks just before midlife. At the end of
life, and because they stop working, wealth is run down fast. For those with modest
wage levels or growth rates, wealth is run down from the very beginning, despite a
slight attempt to buﬀer shocks. (Virtually) no debt is incurred. Leisure proﬁles are
beyond doubt the most homogenous across groups. There is clear substitutability
between leisure and consumption. Leisure was sacriﬁced in the beginning of life to
allow wealth accumulation and insurance against adverse shocks, and increases very
substantially over age for low initial wealth individuals. For high wealth individuals
who can insure against shocks more easily, this pattern is not there.
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Figure 19: Consumption proﬁles in the model with uncertainty in wages
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Figure 20: Leisure proﬁles in the model with uncertainty in wages
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Figure 21: Wealth proﬁles in the model with uncertainty in wages
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Chapter 2 Robustness checks
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Table 14: Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and the
ordinal nature of the dependent variable
Within Groups Probit Ordered Fixed Eﬀects Logit
Age -0.0714*** 0.0026 -0.1180***
(0.0210) (0.0140) (0.0320)
Age2 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Age 21 -0.0244 0.028 -0.0314
(0.0440) (0.0300) (0.0700)
Age 31 -0.5821*** 0.1302 -1.0125***
(0.2210) (0.1550) (0.3450)
Age 41 -1.1590*** 0.1882 -1.9226***
(0.4150) (0.2930) (0.6500)
Age 51 -1.9002*** 0.184 -3.0668***
(0.6120) (0.4330) (0.9570)
Age 60 -2.1504*** 0.3957 -3.5207***
(0.7880) (0.5580) (1.2340)
Born 1925 -0.1096 -0.097
(0.1840) (0.1850)
Born 1935 -0.3651* -0.2927
(0.2200) (0.2200)
Born 1945 -0.2924 -0.2125
(0.3320) (0.3320)
Born 1955 -0.3559 -0.3124
(0.4590) (0.4590)
Born 1965 -0.2391 -0.1928
(0.5900) (0.5900)
Born 1975 0.0024 0.0648
(0.7260) (0.7260)
Born 1983 0.1888 0.258
(0.9050) (0.9040)
Year 1986 -0.6473* -0.6355* 0.3266 0.3278 -1.0050* -0.9789*
(0.3330) (0.3340) (0.2380) (0.2380) (0.5220) (0.5230)
Year 1991 -0.4452* -0.4354* 0.202 0.2022 -0.6506* -0.6298*
(0.2350) (0.2350) (0.1670) (0.1670) (0.3680) (0.3680)
Year 1996 -0.1684 -0.1665 0.1710* 0.1688* -0.28 -0.2723
(0.1390) (0.1390) (0.0990) (0.0990) (0.2180) (0.2180)
Year 2001 0.1065** 0.1054** 0.1506*** 0.1489*** 0.2019*** 0.2011***
(0.0450) (0.0450) (0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0730) (0.0730)
Constant 7.6234*** 6.1821***
Continued on next page
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Table 14 – continued from previous page
Within Groups Probit Ordered Fixed Eﬀects Logit
(0.9680) (0.5840)
R2 0.114 0.116
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Proﬁle Decreasing Decreasing Unrelated Unrelated Decreasing Decreasing
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Additional covariates are gender, bundesland, nationality, marital status, educational diploma,
labor force status, household income and self-reported satisfaction with health and number of
members in the household.
Omitted categories: 20 year olds, year 1984, cohort born between [1924, 1929[, cohort born in 1924.
Table 15: Using schooling cohorts and higher frequency in-
tervals for age and period
yearly frequency Monthly Frequency
Age 21 -0.0233
(0.0428)
Age 31 -0.6052***
(0.1963)
Age 41 -1.2799***
(0.3679)
Age 51 -2.0491***
(0.5414)
Age 60 -2.3884***
(0.6979)
Cohort 1931 1.9868 0.9454***
(1.2e+03) (0.3168)
Cohort 1941 1.0645 0.4980**
(2.1e+03) (0.2361)
Cohort 1951 0.1720 0.2971
(1.2e+03) (0.2272)
Cohort 1961 -0.6329 0.0893
(789.3656) (0.2241)
Cohort 1971 -1.2196 0.1074
(2.3e+03) (0.2192)
Continued on next page
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Table 15 – continued from previous page
yearly frequency Monthly Frequency
Cohort 1981 -1.6821 0.3503
(2.1e+03) (0.2195)
Cohort 1989 -2.2525
(1.2e+03)
Year 1986 -0.3309***
(0.0738)
Year 1991 -0.1050***
(0.0296)
Year 1996 0.2649**
(0.1065)
Year 2001 0.6195***
(0.1913)
R2 0.2942 0.2989
N 132387 93253
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Additional covariates are gender, bundesland, nationality, marital status, educational diploma,
labor force status, household income and self-reported satisfaction with health and number of
members in the household.
Omitted categories: 20 year olds, year 1984, cohort in school in 1929.
Appendix F
Chapter 3 data
The variables used in the paper are as follows.
The Measure of Life Satisfaction (Happiness)
[General Satisfaction] How satisﬁed or dissatisﬁed are you with your life as a whole?
(1 completely satisﬁed up to 7 completely dissatisﬁed).
The Measures of Experienced Domestic Violence
The data set contains two main variables on experienced domestic violence.
200
Have you ever been a victim of domestic violence (yes=1/no=0) (Do-
mestic Violence ever)
and
Please indicate how vulnerable you feel to domestic violence in the future
- using a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 means ”not at all vulnerable” and 7
means ”very vulnerable”?
The latter variable was turned into a binary variable, taking the value 1 when
vulnerability was 4 or higher.
Socio-economic and demographic variables
[Age]
[Gender] (1 male 2 female)
[Household Incomep] A continuous measure based on BHPS annual household
income variable, calculated by replacing each income band value with the income of
the BHPS variable, averaged over the values within the income band.
[Household Incomei] Imputed household income based on BHPS 2004 data, by
matching observations according to Age and Age squared, Gender, Ethnicity, Mari-
tal Status, Education Attained, Employment Status, Dependent Children, Religion,
Regional dummies, Individual income brackets. Interval data estimation was used.
The model imposes by construction that the imputed value falls within the respon-
dent’s household income bracket; however, the probability that that is so is very
low for most of the observations. These probabilities vary from 0.013 for the ﬁrst
percentile, is around one third for the third quartile, two thirds for the ninth decile
and only reaches 0.943 at the 95% percentile.
[Ethnicity] (1 White British 2 Non-white British)
[Marital Status] What is your marital status? (1 married or living as married 2
separated or divorced 3 widowed or never married)
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[Education Attained] What is the highest educational or work-related qualiﬁca-
tion you have? (too many options and regional diﬀerences these were later collapsed
into 4 comparable categories 1 Other Schooling 2 Vocational Diploma 3 CSE A Level
4 University Degree)
[Employment Status] Which of these best applies to you? (1 working 8 or more
hours per week 2 working less than 8 hours per week)
[Dependent Children] How many dependent children do you have that is children
dependent on your income? (1 ”none” 2 ”at least one”)
[Log Hourly wage] Potential wage estimated using comparable individuals from
BHPS. Individuals were matched on the following observables: Age and Age squared,
Gender, Year dummies (from 1998 to 2004), Ethnicity, Marital Status, Education
Attained, Employment Status, Dependent Children, Religion and Regional dum-
mies.
[Postcode and Local Crime Rates] Can you tell us the ﬁrst part of your post-
code this can include up to four letters and numbers (e.g. SE23)? Crime rates
were then retrieved based on postcode information. Local crime data were collected
online from http://www.crimestatistics.org.uk/tool/. This variable measures
the number of all reported crime oﬀences per 1000 individuals in the ﬁrst quarter
of 2004. It is collected at the CDRP (Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships)
level, throughout England and Wales only (we hence lost the 90 observations corre-
sponding to the Scottish sample). It combines police records with the British Crime
Survey self-reported questionnaire of individual experiences.
The Measure of Personality
The measure of personality used derives from answers to the ten questions below.
Each personality dimension combines two polarised traits, so that the positive one
enters positively and the negative one enters negatively towards the ﬁnal score. The
score for each of the ﬁve dimensions is then based on the diﬀerence between the two
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relevant traits (the former minus the latter) and can take a value in the range from
-6 to 6.
[Extraversion] (-6 up 6)
(+) I see myself as extraverted, enthusiastic (1 agree strongly up to 7 disagree
strongly)
(–) I see myself as reserved, quiet (1 agree strongly up to 7 disagree strongly)
[Agreeableness] (-6 up 6)
(+) I see myself as sympathetic, warm (1 agree strongly up to 7 disagree strongly)
(–) I see myself as critical, quarrelsome (1 agree strongly up to 7 disagree
strongly)
[Conscientiousness] (-6 up 6)
(+) I see myself as dependable, self-disciplined (1 agree strongly up to 7 disagree
strongly)
(–) I see myself as disorganised, careless (1 agree strongly up to 7 disagree
strongly)
[Emotional Stability] (-6 up 6)
(+) I see myself as calm, emotionally stable (1 agree strongly up to 7 disagree
strongly)
(–) I see myself as anxious, easily upset (1 agree strongly up to 7 disagree
strongly)
[Openness] (-6 up 6)
(+) I see myself as open to new experience, complex (1 agree strongly up to 7
disagree strongly)
(–) I see myself as conventional, uncreative (1 agree strongly up to 7 disagree
strongly)
The Measure of Distress
The distress index was based on the following questions.
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Have you recently lost much sleep over worry? 1. Not at all 2. No more than
usual 3. Rather more than usual 4. Much more than usual
Have you recently felt constantly under strain? 1. Not at all 2. No more than
usual 3. Rather more than usual 4. Much more than usual
Have you recently been able to enjoy your normal day-to- day activities? 1.
More so than usual 2. Same as usual 3. Less so than usual 4. Much less than usual
At work, have you recently felt that you were playing a useful part in things? 1.
More so than usual 2. Same as usual 3. Less so than usual 4. Much less than usual
Outside of work, have you recently felt that you were playing a useful part in
things? 1. More so than usual 2. Same as usual 3. Less so than usual 4. Much less
than usual
Have you recently been enjoying your recreational activities? 1. More so than
usual 2. Same as usual 3. Less so than usual 4. Much less than usual
Have you recently been thinking of yourself as a worthless person? 1. Not at all
2. No more than usual 3. Rather more than usual 4. Much more than usual
All variables were turned into binary variables, where the value 1 indicates dis-
tress (previous values 3 and 4). All of these values were then added up to create the
index.
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